Narrative Highground: The Failure of Intervention
as a Procedural Device in Affirmative Action
Litigation
By Danielle R. Holley1
Litigation provides an opportunity for parties to seek
legal redress for wrongs, and to define their rights under the
law. Litigation also provides a unique forum for the
presentation of a party’s story or narrative about a
2
The current debate
particular issue or set of facts.
surrounding the consideration of race and ethnicity in
higher education admissions policies has largely been
defined through litigation.
The stories of the parties in higher education
3
affirmative action litigation are so well known that the
1
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See generally Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 307 (1999) (Souter, J.,
concurring); Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997)
(explaining that trial testimony and evidence tell a story with “descriptive
richness” creating a narrative that has the power to support conclusions
and sustain the willingness of the fact finder to draw inferences); Anita F.
Hill, The Scholarly Legacy of A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.: Voice,
Storytelling and Narrative, 53 Rutgers L. J. 641, 643-645 (2001)
(discussing the frequent use of narratives and stories in the law through
the presentation of witnesses, attorneys arguments, and the official
narrative of a case presented in judicial opinions); Richard A. Posner,
Legal Narratology, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 737, 738-39 (1997) (“Stories play a
big role in the legal process. Plaintiff and defendant in a trial each tell a
story, which is actually a translation of their “real” story into the
narrative and rhetorical forms authorized by law, and the jury chooses the
story that it likes better.”)
3
This article uses the term “affirmative action” to refer to all university
admissions policies that include the explicit consideration of race,
ethnicity or national origin as a factor in the admissions process. The
term “affirmative action” originated in a 1961 Executive Order issued by
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average lay person may be able to describe the plaintiff’s
4
claims. The story of the litigation begins when a Caucasian
5
applicant seeks admission to a college or graduate school.
The Caucasian applicant is denied admission, but is aware
that the college or graduate school has an affirmative action
policy under which the school considers race or ethnicity in
the admissions process. The Caucasian applicant files suit
against the university and its officers claiming that the
university’s consideration of race in its admissions process is
unconstitutional.
It is the seemingly straightforward
narrative that has come to define higher education
affirmative action litigation.
President John F. Kennedy requiring government contractors to take
“affirmative action” to prevent discrimination on the basis of “race, creed,
color, or national origin” in hiring and employment practices. Exec. Order
No. 10, 925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961). This executive order was superceded by a
1965 Executive Order issued by President Lyndon Johnson that
established the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. Executive Order
11,246 established a nondiscrimination requirement for private firms
performing work for the federal government, and stated that “[t]he
contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are
employed, and that employees are treated during their employment,
without regard to their, race, creed, color, or national origin.” Lan Cao,
The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1521, 1537 (2003); see also William W. Van Alstyn, Affirmative
Actions, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1517, 1527-30 & n.10 (2000) (tracing the
history and evolution of the term “affirmative action”).
4
There is a distinct contrast between the plaintiff’s narratives in
affirmative action cases, and the plaintiff’s narratives in earlier
desegregation cases. In the school desegregation cases African-American
plaintiffs file suit to end de jure segregation policies in public schools and
universities. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(African-American plaintiffs seek desegregation of public elementary and
secondary schools); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637
(1950) (African-American graduate student challenges school policy
requiring racially segregated facilities); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,
631 (African-American applicant to University of Texas law school
challenges state law allowing admission only to Caucasian applicants).
5
See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003) (stating that
plaintiffs were two white Michigan residents who were denied admission
to the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the
Arts) (“Gratz III”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003)
(“Grutter V”) (describing plaintiff Barbara Grutter as a white resident of
Michigan who applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law
School, and after being denied admission filed suit claiming the law
school’s admission policy used race as a predominant factor in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Hopwood v.
th
State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5 Cir. 1996) (“Hopwood II”) (describing
four plaintiffs as white Texas residents denied admission to University of
Texas law school).
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The second narrative in higher education affirmative
action cases is the narrative of the university defendant.
The university defendant’s narrative is almost as well
known as the plaintiff’s narrative.
The university
defendant’s narrative centers around a defense of
affirmative action on the basis that racial diversity is a
compelling governmental interest as required under
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause analysis,
because racial diversity is integral to the university’s
6
educational mission. Its narrative attempts to demonstrate
that racial diversity allows different perspectives to be
included in classroom discussions, and that producing a
racially diverse group of graduates provides benefits to the
state such as professionals that work in underserved
communities.
The university defendant’s story rarely
includes a discussion of the university or state’s history of
racial discrimination, or any connection between the
university’s current affirmative action program as a remedy
for the university’s past racial discrimination.
The third narrative of the higher education affirmation
action lawsuit is not as well known, and has become
marginalized in both the public and academic debate
surrounding these cases. The third narrative is the story of
7
minority students who are greatly affected by the raceconscious admissions policies as the direct beneficiaries of
8
The minority students’ narrative is
these policies.
6

See, e.g., Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 1245 (describing the University of
Michigan’s defense that race-conscious admissions policies were necessary
to create diverse student body and a rich educational experience); Grutter
V, 123 S.Ct. at 2333-35 (detailing the testimony of the Law School’s
witness regarding diversity as a justification for the school’s raceconscious admissions policy); Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 941 (stating that the
University Of Texas Law School defended its affirmative action
admissions policy by claiming that the goal of the program was to obtain
educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse student body).
7
This Article uses the term “minority students” to define the class of
intervenors. The term “minority” is meant to include African-Americans,
Native Americans, and Hispanics because these racial and ethnic groups
are most often designated as the groups aided by the race-conscious
admissions policies addressed herein. Although this Article refers to the
intervenors’ narrative as equivalent to the minority student’s narrative,
some of the intervenors in these cases include Caucasian students
interested in preserving race-conscious admissions policies.
8
See Emma Coleman Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need
for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 31
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introduced into the litigation through the procedural device
of intervention, which allows a person or group with an
interest in the lawsuit to become a party although the
person or group has not been named as a party by the
9
existing litigants. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 allows
either intervention as a matter of right or permissive
Minority students and public interest
intervention.10
organizations have sought to intervene to defend affirmative
action admissions policies in every recent higher education
11
Minority students and public
affirmative action case.
interest groups were allowed to intervene in the two recent
University of Michigan affirmative action cases, Gratz v.
Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger.12
Similar to the university defendant, the minority
(1979) (stating that minorities have a significant interest in protecting
affirmative action admissions policies); William Kidder, Affirmative
Action in Higher Education: Recent Developments in Litigation,
Admissions, and Diversity Research, 12 La Raza L. J. 173, 174 (“Students
of color–not university administrators–have the broadest, deepest and
most urgent interests in preserving affirmative action.”)
One commentator has suggested that the benefit to minority
students from affirmative action may have led to the erroneous perception
that white applicants are being significantly harmed by these policies.
Goodwin Liu argues that admissions policies that consider race as a factor
may provide minority applicants with a significantly better chance of
being admitted, but that there is no basis to infer that the improved
chances of minority applicants means that white applicants would have a
better chance of being admitted in the absence of affirmative action ,
because affirmative action may not be the actual cause of the white
applicant’s rejection. This “causation fallacy” “erroneously conflates the
magnitude of affirmative action’s instrumental benefit to minority
applicants, which is large, with the magnitude of its instrumental cost to
white applicants, which is small.” Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy:
Bakke and The Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 Mich. L.
Rev. 1045, 1046-49 (2002).
9
7C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1901 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 2002); 6 Edward J. Brunet,
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE–CIVIL § 24.01 (1992).
10 See infra notes 13-14.
11
th
See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5 Cir. 1994) (“Hopwood I”)
(affirming district court’s denial of motion to intervene); Johnson v. Board
th
of Regents University System of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1238 (11 Cir.
2001) (“Johnson II”) (a group of African-American University of Georgia
students permitted to intervene); Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D.
Mich. 1998) (denying motion to intervene) (“Gratz I”); Grutter v.
th
Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6 Cir. 1999) (reversing district court’s denial of
motion to intervene) (“Grutter II”).
12 See Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 396 (holding that minority students and
public interest groups should be allowed to intervene in the litigation).
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students’ narrative focuses on defending the affirmative
action policies. The minority student intervenors often tell a
story about the value of racial diversity to a university
community. However, the minority students’ narrative
diverges from the university defendant’s in an important
way. It often attempts to connect current affirmative action
policies with the state and/or university’s past and current
13
racially discriminatory policies or practices.
This narrative also serves as an alternative viewpoint
on the individualized effects of affirmative action admissions
policies. While the Caucasian plaintiff’s narrative attempts
to portray individualized harm associated with considering
race in admissions, the minority student intervenors present
a narrative of individualized harm associated with
14
admissions programs that do not utilize affirmative action.
This Article will argue that despite intervention in
higher education affirmative action lawsuits, the minority
students’ narrative has been marginalized in these cases. In
litigation, one party’s narrative gains central importance or
relevance and becomes reflected in the court’s
13

See, e.g., Hopwood I, 21 F.3d at 605 (minority students argue that the
their only interest is preserving affirmative action policies to remedy past
discrimination and that minority students are in a better position than
the university to present evidence of recent discrimination); Grutter II,
188 F.3d at 400 (concluding that the minority students’ argument that the
University would be less likely to present evidence of past and current
discrimination was persuasive); Peter Schmidt, Minority Students Win
Right to Intervene in Lawsuit Attacking Affirmative Action, Chronicle of
Higher Education, September 3, 1999, at A68 (lawyer representing
minority student intervenors states “black and other minority students
will be able to bring into the courtroom the truth about continuing
inequality and racism and bias in higher education.”).
14
See generally, Benjamin Baez, The Stories We Tell: Law, Race, and
Affirmative Action from Affirmative Action, Hate Speech, and Tenure
(2002). Baez identifies a variety of stories that are told by both parties
and courts in the course of affirmative action litigation. Baez argues that
the stories told surrounding affirmative action demonstrate how the use
of language perpetuates racial hierarchies and subordination in society.
Baez identifies the story of the “impartial rule applier” in affirmative
action cases in which “the neutral, objective, impartial judge [ ]
mechanically applies the rules of the rational legislature acting in
accordance with the will of the people.” Id. at 107. Baez also identifies
the story of the “intentional discriminator” in which judges struggle to
construct a story about the role of a party’s intention in the
antidiscrimination law and affirmative action. See id. at 112-117. For
the parties in affirmative action litigation Baez identifies stories of the
“stigmatized minority,” “innocent white victim,” and of “individual merit.”
See id. at 116-125.
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decisionmaking.15 In higher education affirmative action
litigation the dominant narrative has become the narrative
of the Caucasian plaintiff. This Article will demonstrate
that the marginalization of the minority students’ narrative
is a direct outgrowth of the minority students’ status as
intervenors, in that intervenors are treated by the court as
outsiders in the framework of litigation. Intervention, a
procedure designed to transform bi-polar litigation into a
context that affords protection to third parties with
substantial interests at stake in the litigation, fails as a
procedural device in these cases.
Part I of this Article will examine and recount the
recent history of intervenors in higher education affirmative
action cases from Bakke to the recent Michigan cases,
Grutter and Gratz. In all of these cases, at varying levels
courts have either refused to hear or have marginalized the
minority students’ narrative.
These cases form three
different categories based on the court’s recognition or
adoption of the minority students’ narrative. The first
category of cases are those in which the minority students’
narrative was completely invisible, because intervention was
denied. This category of cases includes Bakke and Hopwood
v. Texas. The second category of cases are those in which
the minority students’ narrative is marginalized. These
instances of marginalization occur when minority students
become intervenors in the case, however their arguments,
witnesses, and evidence are largely ignored by the courts in
their decisionmaking process.
This category includes
Johnson v. University of Georgia, and the two University of
Michigan affirmative action cases, Gratz and Grutter. The
third category of cases are those in which the minority
students’ narrative is given the full recognition and adopted
by the court. Up to this point, intervention has failed to
produce any cases that would be included in this third
category in which there is full recognition and incorporation
of the minority student’s narrative.
Part II of the Article will examine the failure of
intervention as a procedural device in higher education
affirmative action cases. The relative success or failure of
intervention as a procedural device in these cases will be
measured on two levels.
First, intervention will be
15 See id.
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measured as a procedural device based on the policy
considerations underlying the intervention procedure.
Commentators, most notably Abraham Chayes, have noted
that intervention is one procedural device that is a marker
of public law litigation. Public law litigation is litigation in
which the plaintiff seeks to vindicate their constitutional or
statutory policies in a way that effects more than the parties
themselves. There are many policy reasons underlying
intervention in public law litigation, such as affirmative
action cases. These policy goals include the intervention as
a means of assisting the court in information gathering,
judicial economy, and preventing injury to nonparties. On
most of these policy levels, intervention fails in higher
education affirmative action cases.
In the specific context of higher education affirmative
action cases many commentators have argued that
intervention is necessary in order to insure that the courts
hear the voices of minority students. These commentators
assume that having the status of an intervenor is a good
unto itself in that the intervenors have an opportunity to put
forth their arguments before the court. However, if as in
many of the higher education affirmative action cases, the
intervenors arguments are ignored or not adopted by the
court, intervention a less effective procedural mechanism.
Part III will argue that the central value of
intervention sought to be fulfilled by the minority student
intervenors is the opportunity to present a distinctive
narrative to both courts and the public, which is not being
presented by either the plaintiff or university defendants in
affirmative action cases. However intervention efforts have
failed to present a meaningful opportunity for minority
students to become the central narrative in the continuing
legal debate surrounding affirmative action.
Therefore, Part III proposes that in the affirmative
action debate continuing following the Supreme Court’s
decisions Grutter and Gratz minority students should
abandon their efforts at intervention, and instead become
plaintiffs in lawsuits to challenge current “race neutral”
admissions standards such as the Law School Admissions
Test (“LSAT”). In the alternative, minority students may
choose to take legislative action through ballot initiatives
and other measure to replace traditional admissions criteria
and expand the current justifications for race-conscious
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admissions policies. Through the procedural positioning of
themselves as plaintiffs or as the authors of legislative
reform, minority students will be able to meet their goal of
recognition of their unique narrative.

Part I: Intervention in Higher Education
Affirmative Action Litigation
Intervention is a procedural device intended to enable
a party or group with a substantial interest in the subject of
litigation to become a party in the case to protect their
16
rights. Intervention is often compared to other procedural
devices in the federal rules that “recognize that a lawsuit is
often not merely a private fight and will have implications
on those not named as parties.”17 Although intervention does
16

See Wright & Miller, supra note 9 at § 1901 (stating that intervention is
a procedure in which an outsider in a lawsuit becomes a party although
not named as a party by the exiting litigants); James Wm. Moore &
Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention I. The Right to Intervene and
Reorganization, 45 Yale L. J. 565 (1936) (describing intervention as a
procedural device that allows a stranger to the litigation to present a
claim or defense in a pending action, thus becoming a party in the
proceeding); Jean M. Radler, When is Intervention as a Matter of Right
Appropriate Under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Civil Rights Actions, 132 A.L.R. Fed 147 (1996) (same).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 was adopted in 1938 in an attempt to
codify existing practice in federal courts at law and in equity. WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note __ at § 1903. Originally the rule allowed for
intervention as a matter of right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) when a
party had an interest in the litigation that was not adequately
represented by the parties. The rule provided a separate category for
intervention as a matter of right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(3) when a
party had an interest that may adversely affected by the distribution of
property in the court’s custody. Id. A substantial amendment to fed. R.
Civ. P. 24 occurred in 1966, when these two categories were collapsed into
a single provision under 24(a)(2) to allow intervention as a matter of right
when the existing parties fail to adequately represent the intervenor’s
property interest or other substantial interest. Id. The 1966 amendment
also altered the language of the rule to no longer require that intervenors
be third parties that would be bound by the court’s judgment under the
principles of res judicata, instead under the current rule the intervenor
applicant need only establish that the disposition of the action may “as a
practical matter impair or impede” the applicant’s ability to protect their
interests. Id.
17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9 at § 1901. The other procedural
devices that attempt to protect the interests of third parties not initially
named in the lawsuit include FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (compulsory joinder), and
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class actions). Id; Moore & Levi, supra note __ at 56567 (comparing intervention to joinder in its use as a procedural
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not create a cause of action, intervenors have rights similar
18
to those of parties in the litigation. Intervenors may file
motions, participate in discovery, introduce direct testimony,
19
conduct cross-examination and appeal adverse rulings. An
intervenor’s ability to add witnesses and present separate
and sometime conflicting positions on existing issues in the
litigation often leads to the litigation becoming more
20
complex. Due to the increased burden on the court and the
existing parties as a result of intervention, the rule itself
and courts interpreting the rule have standards to
determine when a party should be allowed to intervene in a
pending action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides
for two types of intervention: intervention as a matter of
21
right and permissive intervention.
Intervention as a matter of right, under FED. R. CIV.
P. 24(a) is allowed when a federal statute confers a right of
intervention to the applicant for intervention, or when the
applicant can demonstrate that they have an interest in the
subject matter of the transaction, and that their ability to
protect that interest may be substantially impaired by the
mechanism for the protection of third party interests).
18
See Radler, supra note 16 at 147 ; Carl Tobias, Intervention After
Webster, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 731, 738-39 (1990).
19
Tobias, Intervention after Webster, supra note 18 at 738-39.
20
Gene R. Shreve, Questioning Intervention as a Matter of Right- Toward a
New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 894, 903 (1980).
21
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 states:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United
States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United
States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense
upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state
governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order,
requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or
executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be
permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of rights of the original parties.
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court’s disposition of the case.22 The majority of circuits use
a four part standard to determine whether a party’s motion
to intervene as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(a)(2) should be granted: (1) timeliness of the filing of the
motion, (2) whether the proposed intervenor claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the litigation, (3) whether the disposition of the
litigation may impair of impede the proposed intervenor’s
right to protect that interest, and (4) whether the proposed
intervenor’s interest is adequately represented by the
23
In recent higher education affirmative
existing parties.
action litigation the applicants for intervention have sought
to intervene as a matter of right, by demonstrating that they
had a substantial interest in the university being allowed to
continue to consider race as a factor in admissions, and that
their interest were not adequately represented by the
university defendants.
From Bakke to the most recent Michigan cases, at
varying levels courts have either refused to hear or have
marginalized the minority students’ narrative. These cases
form three different categories or groups based on the court’s
recognition or adoption of the minority students’ narrative.
The first category of cases are those in which the minority
students’ narrative was completely invisible, because
intervention was denied.
This category of cases would
include Bakke and Hopwood v. Texas. The second category
of cases are those in which the minority students’ narrative
is marginalized. These instances of marginalization occur

22 See id.
23

See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972)
(describing the standard for a federal court to intervention as a matter of
right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)); United States v. City of Los Angeles,
th
288 F.3d 391, 397 (9 Cir. 2002) (same); Reid v. Illinois State Board of
th
Education, 289 F.3d 1009, 1017 (7 Cir. 2002) (same); Butler, Fitzgerald
& Potter v. Sequa, 250 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Loyd v.
th
Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 176 F.3d 1336 (11 Cir. 1999); Public
st
Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 204 (1 Cir. 1998)
(same); Standard Heating & Air Conditioning v. Minneapolis, 137 F.3d
th
567, 571 (8 Cir. 1998) (same); Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103
th
F.3d 1240, 1245 (6 Cir. 1997) (same); Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico
th
Counties v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 841 (10 Cir. 1996); Mountain
Top Condominium Ass’n v. Stabbert, 72 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1995)
th
(same); Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (5 Cir. 1994); Teague
th
v. Baker, 931 F.2d 259, 261 (4 Cir. 1991) (same); C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note __, § 1907; Brunet, supra note __, § 24.03.
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when minority students become intervenors in the case,
however their arguments, witnesses and evidence are
largely ignored by the courts in their decisionmaking
process. This category includes Johnson v. University of
Georgia, and the two University of Michigan affirmative
action cases, Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger.
The third category of cases are those in which the minority
students’ narrative is given the full recognition and adopted
by the court. Up to this point, intervention has failed to
produce any cases that would be included in this third
category in which there is full recognition and incorporation
of the minority student’s narrative.

Part II.A: Invisible Intervenors– Bakke and Hopwood
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, a
Caucasian applicant, Allen Bakke was denied admission to
24
the University of California at Davis Medical School.
Bakke filed suit against the medical school claiming that the
medical school’s race-conscious admissions policy violated
the federal constitution, California’s state constitution, and
25
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Unlike recent higher
education affirmative action cases, Bakke filed his lawsuit in
state court, therefore Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 was not available for
minority students or public interest groups to seek
26
intervention. At the trial court level no intervention was
sought, however, when the case reached the California
Supreme Court the NAACP Legal Defense Fund requested
that the case be remanded to the trial court “for a new trial
with directions to the trial court to permit the real parties in
interest [minority students] to present evidence on the full

24

Bakke, 483 U.S. at 276. The facts of Bakke have received significant
treatment. See Liu, supra note __ at 1050-1054 (describing the medical
school’s admissions policy and Bakke’s qualifications).
25
Bakke, 483 U.S. at 278
- 79.
26
See id. at 277 (suit filed in the Superior Court of California). At the
time Bakke was filed California did allow intervention entirely at the
discretion of the trial court, however intervention was not sought at the
initial trial proceedings in Bakke. See James, infra note __ at 34, n.11
(citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 387 (West 1973)). After Bakke, the
California legislature amended the state’s intervention rule to conform
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Id.
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range of issues.”27 The California Supreme Court failed to
address this request for a remand, and thus neither
minority students nor public interest groups became
28
intervenors in Bakke.
29
Hopwood v. Texas presents another example of the
complete invisibility of the minority students’ narrative in
affirmative action litigation that flows from the denial of a
motion to intervene. In Hopwood, a Caucasian applicant to
the University of Texas law school filed suit against the
State of Texas, the Board of regents of the Texas State
University System, and the University of Texas Law school
claiming that the law school’s admissions procedures that
30
Two
considered race as a factor were unconstitutional.
groups representing minority students, the Thurgood
Marshall Legal Society and the Black Pre-Law Association
31
sought to intervene in the lawsuit.
27

Jones, supra note __ at 33, n.11 (citing Petition of NAACP for Leave to
File as Amicus Curiae on petition for Rehearing).
28
The California Supreme Court’s lack of response to the NAACP’s
petition was likely due to the procedural posture of the case at the time
the NAACP sought the equivalent of intervention. At the trial court level
the court found in favor of Bakke, holding that the medical school’s
admissions policy violated the federal constitution, state constitution, and
Title VI because the admissions policy operated as a racial quota. Bakke,
483 U.S. at 279. The trial court refused to grant the injunctive relief
sought by Bakke on the basis that the Bakke failed to carry his burden
that he would have been admitted to the medical school but for the
existence of the affirmative action program. Id. The California Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court’s holding regarding violation of the federal
constitution, and initially ordered remand for a new trial on the issue of
whether Bakke would have been admitted to the medical school. See id.
at 280. The medical school filed a petition for rehearing that included a
stipulation that the medical school could not demonstrate that Bakke
would have been denied admission absent the affirmative action program.
See id. After this stipulation was entered the California Supreme Court
amended its opinion to provide for an entrance of judgment, instead of a
remand for a trial. Id. The NAACP’s request for a remand for a new trial
in which intervenors could be heard was filed after the medical school’s
stipulation, thus when the California Supreme Court reconsidered its
remand due to the stipulation there would no longer be a trial in which
intervenors could participate as parties. See James, supra note __ at 33,
n.9 (explaining that the NAACP’s request for a remand to allow
intervention came after the medical school’s stipulation, but before the
Court’s decision on the petition for rehearing).
29
th
Hopwood I, 21 F.3d 603 (5 Cir. 1994).
30
Id. at 604.
31
The proposed intervenors sought both intervention as a matter of right
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and in the alternative, permissive
intervention.
The Fifth Circuit utilizes the majority standard for

14
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The district court denied the motion to intervene and
th
e Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion finding
that the intervenors failed to establish that the Law School
32
would not adequately represent the intervenors’ interests.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the proposed intervenors
failed to demonstrate that the law school would not strongly
defend its affirmative action policy, or that the intervenors
had a separate defense for the program based on a past
33
discrimination argument.
Despite the common goals of UT Law School and the
minority applicants for intervention–to maintain the raceconscious admissions policy–the minority students
presented a narrative that was far from identical to that of
the university. The proposed intervenors argued that they
had an interest in both maintaining the UT Law School’s
then existing admissions policy, and also in eliminating
34
The proposed intervenors
vestiges of past discrimination.
also proffered that race-conscious remedies were necessary
as a response to the state and university’s past
35
discriminatory practices. The proposed intervenors further
claimed that their unique narrative would provide better
intervention as of right: (1) interest in the subject matter of the litigation,
(2) that disposition of the action may practically impair or impede the
movant’s ability to protect that interest, and (3) that the interest is not
adequately represented by the existing parties. Id. at 605 (citing Diaz v.
th
Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 878, 91 S.Ct. 118, 27 L.Ed. 2d 115 (1970)).
32
Id. The Fifth Circuit stated that while the burden for a party to
demonstrate inadequate representation is generally “minimal,” in cases
where the party whose representation is at issue is a government agency
the burden to demonstrate inadequate representation is higher. Id.
(citing 7C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1909 (1986)). This higher burden is due to the presumption
that the State represents the interests of all the state citizens. Id. This
presumption of adequate representation when the government is a party
has been criticized by many courts and commentators. See Katherine
Goepp, Presumed Represented: Analyzing Intervention as of Right When
the Government is a Party, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 131 (2002) (proposing
that there should be no presumption of adequate representation when the
government is a party).
33
See Hopwood I, 21 F.3d at 605; supra note 26.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 605 (“The BPLA and TMLS argue that they have met their
burden of showing that their interests are different from the State’s . . .
Moreover, they argue that because of its competing goals, the State is not
in as good a position to bring in the evidence of present effects of past
discrimination and current discrimination.”)
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evidence of the past discrimination.36

Part II.B: Marginalized Intervenors: Johnson, Grutter &
Gratz
In Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University
System of Georgia, three Caucasian female plaintiffs filed
suit against the University of Georgia (“UGA”) claiming that
UGA’s 1999 admissions policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, and Title IX by considering race and gender
37
in the admissions process. Shortly after the lawsuit was
filed, a group of African-American UGA students and
potential applicants represented by the NAACP Legal
38
Defense Fund were allowed to intervene in the lawsuit.
The district court granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs, holding that UGA’s admissions policy violated
the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI and Title IX, and
specifically finding that creating diversity was not a
compelling interest to justify the consideration of race or
39
gender in the admissions process. On appeal, the Eleventh
36

Id.
Johnson v. Board of Regents University System of Georgia, 263 F.3d
th
1234, 1238 (11 Cir. 2001) (“Johnson II”); Johnson v. Board of Regents
University System of Georgia, 106 F.Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2000)
(“Johnson I”).
UGA’s 1999 admissions policy used a three tiered
evaluation system. First, the university compiled an academic index
based on a applicant’s standardized test scores and high school GPA. All
students with AI scores over a certain designation were admitted. These
students with an AI score under the automatic admission score, but above
a minimum AI were reclassified and given a Total Student Index (“TSI”)
ranking. Non-Caucasian applicants, including Asian Americans, AfricanAmericans, Native Americans, Hispanics, and “multi-racial” students
were awarded .5 additional TSI points. Male applicants were awarded .25
points. The university also offered bonus admissions points for students
with both parents with no college education, and all Georgia residents.
All applicants with a TSI score of 4.93 or higher were admitted.
Applicants with a TSI score between 4.66 and 4.93 were then evaluated by
“readers’ who admitted students based qualities not evaluated at the
other stages of the admissions process. See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 12401242; Johnson I, 106 F.Supp. 2d at 1365.
38
See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1238.
39
See Johnson I, 106 F.Supp.2d at 1367-1372 (arguing that Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bakke regarding diversity as a compelling interest is
not binding precedent, and that post-Bakke affirmative action cases by the
Supreme Court do not support the view that diversity is a compelling
37
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the plaintiffs, but refused to affirm the district
court’s holding that diversity was not a compelling interest
that would justify the UGA’s consideration of race as a factor
40
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit
in its admissions policy.
found that even if creating diversity was a compelling
interest UGA’s admissions policy was not narrowly tailored
41
to meet this goal.
Both the district court and appellate court in Johnson
largely ignored the arguments of the intervenors.
The
intervenors agreed with the university defendants that
diversity was a compelling interest that would allow the
university to consider race in the admissions process,
however, the intervenors also contended that the
consideration of race was necessary to eliminate vestiges of
past discrimination. The intervenors argued at summary
judgment that UGA’s history of de jure and de facto racial
discrimination was extensive. For UGA’s first 160 years no
42
African-American students were admitted. After AfricanAmerican students were admitted in 1961, the Office of Civil
Rights (“OCR”) ordered UGA to submit a desegregation plan
and adopt affirmative action programs to alleviate vestiges
43
of the university’s past discrimination.
The district court only addressed the university’s
argument that the admissions policy was justified by the
university’s desire to create student body diversity. The
district court never acknowledged in the factual background
or legal analysis the university’s history of overt
discrimination towards African-Americans, and the role of
affirmative action in alleviating vestiges of past

interest).
40
See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1237 (affirming the district court’s
determination that UGA’s 1999 admission policy was unconstitutional,
but not adopting the district court’s conclusion that student body diversity
is not a compelling interest sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis
applied to government policies that utilize race as a criteria).
41
See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1244-1258 (finding that the court need not
resolve the issue of whether student body diversity is a compelling
interest because UGA’s system of “mechanically” awarding bonus points
to all applicants of certain racial and ethnic groups was narrowly tailored
to meet the diversity goal because applicants were not considered on an
individualized basis).
42
Id. at 1239.
43
Id.
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discrimination.44
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the
intervenors’ past discrimination argument directly.
However, the appellate court acknowledged the intervenors’
argument that UGA’s race-conscious admissions policy was
necessary to ameliorate the vestiges of intentional past
discrimination, however, the court claimed that the
intervenors’ sufficiently raise this issue before the district
45
The court acknowledged UGA’s past de jure
court.
segregation policies, but claimed that the summary
46
The
judgment evidence on this point was insufficient.
appellate court also claimed that OCR’s 1989 lifting of the
desegregation order demonstrated that affirmative action
was no longer necessary to ameliorate vestiges of past
47
discrimination. Also, the appellate court noted that UGA
itself disavowed past discrimination as a justification for its
consideration of race in the admissions process.48
In 1997, Caucasian plaintiffs filed two separate
lawsuits challenging admissions procedures at the
University of Michigan College of Literature, Arts and
49
Science (“LSA”) and Law School respectively. In the law
school suit, Grutter v. Bollinger, the plaintiff, Barbara
Grutter, claimed that the law school’s admissions process
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
considering an applicant’s race or ethnicity
in the
50
admissions process.
A group of forty-one individual minority students, and
three pro-affirmative action coalitions applied for
44

See Johnson I, 106 F.Supp. 2d at 1367-70 (analyzing the UGA
admissions policy only under Bakke and post-Bakke case law regarding
diversity as a compelling government interest).
45
See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1264 (“Intervenors did not advance [the past
discrimination argument] in any meaningful way at the time of summary
judgment.”)
46
See id. at 1264 (stating that there was little persuasive evidence in the
summary judgment record to support the intervenors’ argument that
“preferential treatment of all non-white applicants” was necessary to
remedy present effects of past discrimination.)
47
Id. at 1264-65.
48
Id.
49
See Grutter V, 123 S. Ct. at 2332; Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d
811, 813 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
50
See Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2332 (describing the plaintiff’s claims);
th
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6 Cir. 2002) (same).
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intervention in the Grutter.51 The forty-one individual
student applicants were divided into three groups. First, the
applicants for intervention included twenty-one AfricanAmerican, Latino, Caucasian and Asian undergraduates
from various institutions who asserted that they intended to
52
The
apply to the University of Michigan law school.
individual applicants also included five African-American
high school students who intended to apply for admission to
53
The last group of individual
LSA and the Law School.
applicants included fifteen African-American, Caucasian,
Latino/a, and Asian graduate students, including twelve
54
Joining the individual intervenor
Law School students.
applicants were three organizations: United for Equality
and Affirmative Action, a coalition of the individual
intervenors, the parents of the minor applicants for
intervention and other affirmative action supporters; the
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action By Any Means
Necessary (“BAMN”), a
political action coalition with
chapters in California and Michigan; and Law Students for
Affirmative Action a pro-affirmative action organization
which organized campus demonstrations in support of
55
affirmative action.
The intervenor applicants sought intervention in
56
March 1998. The intervenor applicants claimed that they
should be allowed to intervene as a matter of right under
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) because the Law School could not
57
adequately represent their interests in the lawsuit.
Specifically, the applicants argued that the Law School
would fail to raise several defenses, including the Law
School’s past discriminatory practices, the continuing use of

51

th

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 397 (6 Cor. 1999) (“Grutter II”);
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Intervention at 2, Grutter
v. Bollinger (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-75928) (“Grutter I”).
52
See Motion to Intervene, supra note51, at 2 -3. The undergraduate
student intervenors included undergraduates from the University of
Michigan, University of California at Berkeley, Wayne State University,
and Diablo Valley Community College.
53
Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 397
54
Id.
55
Motion to Intervene, supra note 51,at 5
56
Id. at 3.
57
See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 51, at
3. In the alternative, the proposed intervenors also sought permissive
intervention as allowed under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b). Id. at 11.
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racially discriminatory admissions criteria such as the
LSAT, and that the Law School would not be able to produce
sufficient evidence related to segregation and resegregation
58
of educational institutions.
The district court initially denied the applicants’
motion to intervene as a mater of right.59 The district court
found, similar to the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood, that the
applicants for intervention failed to establish that they had
a different interest from the Law School defendants, and
that the Law School defendants would not adequately
60
The district court
represent the applicants’ interest.
concluded that the applicants for intervention had the same
“ultimate objective” as the Law School defendants, to
preserve the current admissions policy that takes race and
61
ethnicity into consideration.
Similarly, the district court in Gratz also denied the
intervenor applicants’ motion to intervene.62 The intervenor
applicants in Gratz included seventeen African-American
and Latino/a high school students who intended to or
already applied to LSA, and one organization, the Citizens
63
The
for Affirmative Action’s Preservation (“CAAP”).
district court found that the intervenor applicants failed two
64
The district court
of the requirements for intervention.
concluded that the intervenor applicants lacked a
substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation, and that
the applicants failed to demonstrate that the University
65
defendants inadequately represented their interests.
The Sixth Circuit hearing a consolidated appeal on the
intervenor applicants’ motions to intervene in both Gratz
and Grutter reversed the district courts’ decisions and held
58

See Motion to Intervene, supra note 51, at 6.

59 See Grutter I, supra note 50, at 6 (opinion and order denying motion to

intervene)
60
Id.
61
Id. The district court assumed, without deciding, that the intervenor
applicants had a “significant legal interest” in the case and that their
ability to protect that interest could be impaired by an adverse finding in
the case. The district court relied on the Fifth Circuits denial of
intervention in Hopwood finding that the circumstances of the two cases
were “virtually identical.” Id.
62
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (“Gratz I”).
63
See Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 397.
64
See Gratz I, 183 F.R.D. at 210.
65
See Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 397.
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that the intervenor applicants in both cases met the
66
requirements for intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.
The Sixth Circuit examined the intervenor applicants legal
interest in the litigation. The court noted that in the Sixth
Circuit there is “a rather expansive notion of the interest
67
sufficient to invoke intervention of right.” Based on this
broad definition of a substantial legal interest the Sixth
Circuit panel found that the intervenor applicants’ interest
in maintaining race and ethnicity as a factor in the
admissions process was sufficient to meet the intervention
68
The court described the intervenor
requirements.
applicants’
interest as an interest in preserving the
numbers of minorities enrolled at LSA and the Law School,
69
The court
and in preserving educational opportunity.
rejected the Gratz district court’s conclusion that a
“substantial legal interest” must be a legally enforceable
70
right to have the admissions policy construed. Instead the
court noted that the intervenor applicants “specific interest
in the subject matter of this case, namely their interest in
gaining admission to the University” was a direct interest
more than sufficient to constitute a “substantial legal
71
interest” under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
The intervenors in Gratz and Grutter presented a
unique narrative characterized by three aspects: past
discrimination, the institutional racism undergirding the
use of LSAT scores and GPA as admissions criteria, and the
state’s unitary education system. The first focus of the
intervenors’ narrative was their emphasis on the link
between race-conscious admissions programs and the
72
The
University’s history of overt racial discrimination.
intervenors claimed that a central justification for the
current University admissions policies were that the policies
66

See id.
Id. at 398 (quoting Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240,
th
1245 (6 Cir. 1997)).
68
See id. (explaining that the Gratz court erred in finding that in order for
the proposed intervenors to have a “significant legal interest” as required
under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) the intervenors must have legally
enforceable right to have the court determine the constitutionality of the
current admissions policy).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 399.
71
Id.
72
See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
67
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serves as a remedy for the past discrimination.73 The
intervenors argued that the University was unlikely to raise
this defense because the defense would require the
university to highlight its discriminatory practice, possibly
74
subjecting the University to liability.
The intervenors argued that the University of
Michigan’s affirmative action policy was in direct response
to civil rights protests to end racial discrimination by the
75
university. According to the intervenors, African-American
students at the University of Michigan organized the Black
Action Movement (“BAM”) in March 1970 to encourage the
university to increase African-American enrollment.76 As a
result of a strike organized by BAM the University
announced that it would attempt to meet the student’s
demands for increased enrollment through an affirmative
77
action program. The intervenors also asserted that as a
result of protests by black students in 1975 and 1987 the
then president of the University issued a mandate which
became the framework for the current University
78
admissions policies, including the Law School’s 1992 policy.
At trial, the intervenors also clarified the past
discrimination aspect of their narrative through offering
79
trial testimony. The intervenors presented two witnesses
to testify regarding the history of racial inequality in the
United States. Historian John Hope Franklin (“Professor
Franklin”), professor emeritus of history at Duke University
73

Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Intervention, supra note
__ at 9.
74
See id. at 9
75
See id. at 2.
76 See id.
77
See id.
78
Id.
79
In Grutter, the district court conducted a fifteen day bench trial in
January and February 2001. The district court asked the parties to focus
on three issues: “(1) the extent to which race is a factor in the law school’s
admissions decision; (2) whether the law school’s consideration of race in
making admissions decision constitutes a double standard in which
minority and non-minority students are treated differently; and (3)
whether the law school may take race into account to ‘level the playing
field’ between minority and non-minority applicants.”
Grutter v.
Bollinger, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2001) (“Grutter III”),
available at http://www.bamn.comce/2001/010327-friedman-ruling.pdf.
The plaintiffs, defendants, and intervenors were allotted thirty hours to
present their evidence. The intervenors utilized all of their time and
presented fifteen witnesses.
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testified about the history of race relations in the United
80
Professor Franklin’s testimony included a wideStates.
ranging account of racial hostilities and inequality,
81
including race riots and Jim Crow segregation. Eric Foner,
a leading history professor also testified about the general
history of racial oppression and inequality in the United
82
States.
The second aspect of the Grutter intervenors’
narrative was the emphasis on what the intervenors argued
is an inherent racial bias in the use of standardized testing
83
and GPA as admissions criteria. The intervenors argued
that the use of LSAT alone, without the consideration of race
as a factor in admissions would lead to the resegregation of
84
This
most elite institutions of higher education.
resegregation would occur as a result of the “LSAT gap” that
exists between the LSAT scores of minority students and
85
The intervenors’ expert suggested that
white students.
this gap existed based on cultural bias in the test itself, and
the experiences of the test takers that influence their test
86
taking methods. The intervenors concluded that in order to
fairly evaluate the LSAT scores of an applicant as a criteria
for admissions the law school must take race into account in
order to account for the “LSAT gap” which is caused by
80

United for Equality and Affirmative Action Legal Defense Fund, Grutter
v.
Bollinger,
No.
97-75928,
Trial
Outline,
at
http://www.ueaa.net/case.htm#trial.
81
See Tr. Transr. Vol. 7, 17:23-18:4, 18:8-13, 19:19-20:4 (Jan. 24, 2001),
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CVth
75928), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6 Cir. 2002), aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
82
See Tr. Transr. Vol. 10 226:2-22, 244:4-9, 250:21-251:9, 252:21-253:8
(Feb. 8, 2001), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
th
(No. 97-CV-75928), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6 Cir. 2002), aff’d, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (2003).
83
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and In Opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Grutter IV, at 27-36.
84
Id. at 29, 31.
85
See Tr. Transr. Vol. 11, 140:17-24, 141:8-20, 144:20-24, 145:10-13,
147:14-17 (Feb. 9, 2001), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D.
th
Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CV-75928), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6 Cir. 2002), aff’d,
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). David White, Director of Testing for the Public,
testified regarding the “LSAT gap” that “[w]hen we looked at the minority
students’ LSAT scores and compared that to all their comparable whites
from the same school, we found that African Americans had 10 points
lower LSAT scores on average than the white students from the same
college with the same grades.” Id. at Vol. 11, 144:20
- 24.
86
Id. at Vol. 11, 155:10
- 13.
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racially related factors.87
The final aspect of the Grutter intervenors’ narrative
was their focus on the unitary nature of the state
88
educational system. One of the continuous themes in the
intervenors’ arguments and the testimony offered by them
at trial was the notion that a state’s higher education
system must be viewed as a continuation of the elementary
and secondary school education offered by the state of
89
The intervenors argued that segregation and
Michigan.
inequality in elementary and secondary education is
increasing, which is another cause of the continuing gap
90
between minorities and whites standardized tests. Also, a
witness the intervenors claimed that the elimination of
affirmative action in higher education also has a trickle
down negative impact on elementary and secondary schools,
increasing inequality and eroding the overall quality of
91
public education in the state.
The district court in Grutter, is the only court during
the course of the litigation addressed the intervenors’
presentation of facts and legal arguments directly. The
87

Id. at Vol. 11, 159:23-160:3 (“[Race] should be taken into account in
evaluating the LSAT scores of the applicant. An aspect of evaluating the
information is knowing the LSAT score, and knowing the race of the
people who took the LSAT is part and parcel of evaluating that part of the
applicant’s file.”) The intervenors also argued that the grade point
average of minority students is negatively affected due to a racially hostile
atmosphere on most elite college campuses. Professor Walter Allen
testified that African-American students at predominantly black
universities do better than their peers at predominantly white
institutions, and this difference is attributed to the racial hostility
encountered by African-American students at white institutions. See id.
at Tr. Transr. Vol. 9, 88:3-17, 93:10-19, 103:12-17 (Feb. 7, 2001), Grutter
v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CV-75928),
th
rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6 Cir. 2002), aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
88
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 77, at 30-31.
89
Id. at 31.
90
Id. at 30. See Defendant-Intervenors’ Final Brief at 8-16, Grutter v.
th
Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6 Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1516) (arguing that the
nation’s primary and secondary schools remain largely segregated and
these schools “systematically disadvantage black, Latino/a, and Native
American students of all social and economic backgrounds.”)
91
Id. at 31. Eugene Garcia, Dean of the Graduate School of Education at
the University of California at Berkeley testified that in jurisdictions such
as California where affirmative action was eliminated at the university
level, the overall quality of education at the primary and secondary school
level declined. Id.
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Grutter district court held that under Bakke creating racial
diversity was not a compelling interest such that would
allow the Law School to consider race as a factor in
92
admissions in a constitutionally permissible manner. After
a detailed treatment of the plaintiffs’ and defendants’
evidence and legal arguments, the district court provided a
separate analysis of the intervenors’ witnesses and exhibits,
93
and their legal arguments.
The district court summarized the testimony of each of
the intervenors’ witnesses and presented findings of fact and
conclusions of law specifically addressing the intervenors’
94
The district court pointed to the GPA and
arguments.
LSAT gap between Caucasians and the minority groups
specified in the Law School’s admissions policy and
95
acknowledged that the reasons for the gap were “complex.”
The court acknowledged that “while one must be cautious in
making generalization, the evidence at trail clearly indicates
that much of the GPA gap is due to the fact that
92

Id. at 49. The district court also held, in the alternative, that even if
diversity were a compelling interest the Law School’s admissions policy
was not narrowly tailored to serve this interest. See id. at 49-54. After
concluding that the Law School’s admissions policy was not narrowly
tailored, the district court found that the individual defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages. See id. at 54.
Also, the court held that the Law School’s policy violated Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, and that the individual defendants could be held
liable for monetary damages under Title VI. See id. at 57-58. The district
court pointed to the policy’s use of the term “critical mass” as a goal for
the number of minority students that should be enrolled at the Law
School, and determined that “critical mass” was insufficiently defined to
meet the requirements for narrow tailoring. See id. The court also
determined the law school policy insured the enrollment of a minimum
percentage of minority students, making the policy indistinguishable from
a quota. See id. at 49-50. The district court also concluded that the
narrow tailoring criteria was not met due to the policy’s lack of a time
limit on the use of race. See id. at 50. Finally, the district court also
found that the law School’s admissions policy failed the narrow tailoring
requirement by failing to provide a sufficient reason for considering race
only for African-Americans, native Americans, and Hispanics, and that
the Law School failed to investigate race neutral methods for creating
diversity in enrollment. See id. at 51-54. The court argued that other
groups beyond the three identified in the admissions policy had been
subjected to discrimination, “such as Arabs and southern and eastern
Europeans,” but the law school made no commitment to enroll these
students in “meaningful numbers.” Id. at 52.
93
See id. 59-89.
94
See id. at 71-80.
95
Id. at 75.
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disproportionate numbers of Native Americans, African
Americans, and Hispanics live and go to school in
96
The court reasoned
impoverished areas of the country.”
that even if you accept the intervenors’ factual assertions,
the intervenors’ arguments fail as a basis for the law
School’s admissions policy because the Supreme Court has
rejected general societal discrimination as a justification for
97
“race-conscious decision making.”
In contrast to the district court’s detailed, although
disparate, treatment of the intervenors’ evidence and legal
arguments, the Sixth Circuit largely ignored the
intervenors. The Sixth Circuit found that diversity was a
compelling interest in the creation of the Law School’s
98
admissions policy. The Sixth Circuit never addressed the
intervenors’ contention that the Law School’s admissions
99
The
policy was justified based on past discrimination.
Court explained that as a result of their finding that
diversity is a compelling interest they would not address the
100
Therefore,
intervenors’ past discrimination argument.
96

Id. at 75. The district court did not accept all of the intervenors’
evidence regarding the GPA gap. The district court harshly criticized the
expert report of Professor Allen who testified regarding a study he
conducted which showed that minority students at majority
undergraduate institutions face racially hostile environments that inhibit
their ability to succeed academically. See id. at 65. The district court
concluded that the court was unable “to give any weight to Professor
Allen’s study [of the GPA gap], due to the small number of students who
participated in the focus groups and surveys and due to the manner in
which the students were selected.” Id. at 76.
97
Id. at 83 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274).
The district court draws this conclusion without considering the unique
context of an educational setting. The recent Supreme Court cases
dismissing general societal discrimination as a justification for affirmative
action were in the government contracts and employment contexts, not
education. Also, the district court failed to distinguish between raceconscious policies based on past discrimination, and policies based on
continuing or present racial disparities. The intervenors also presented
evidence of present discrimination specifically in the Michigan public
education system, through the testimony regarding the ongoing racial
segregation in secondary and elementary school’s in Michigan.
98
Grutter IV, supra note ___ at 739 (stating that because the court is
bound by Bakke the Court finds that the Law School has a compelling
interest in creating a diverse student body).
99
See id.
100
Id. (“Because we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in
achieving a diverse student body, we do not address whether the
Intervenors’ proffered interest–an interest in remedying past
discrimination–is sufficiently compelling for equal protection.”)
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after an offer of substantial trial testimony related to past
discrimination, this aspect of the intervenors’ narrative was
neither addressed nor adopted by the University defendants
or the court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion that the Law School’s use of race and ethnicity in its
admissions policy did not violate either the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the 1964
101
Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court found that while the
use of race is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis to assure
its compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment, creating
diversity in the law school environment is a compelling
government interest and the Law School’s 1992 policy was
102
The majority opinion
narrowly tailored to meet this goal.
completely ignores the intervenors and past discrimination
as an additional alternative justification for the Law
103
In the factual and procedural
School’s admission’s policy.
history of the case, the majority fails to acknowledge that
the intervenors applied for intervention and after being
included in the case present thirty hours of testimony at
104
There is no mention in the majority opinion of past
trial.
discrimination as an alternative justification for the
admissions policy.
The likely reason that the majority opinion completely
ignored the intervenors and their arguments was the Court’s
framing of the issue before it for consideration. The Court
stated that certiorari was granted “to resolve the
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a question of
national importance: Whether diversity is a compelling
interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in
105
selecting applicants for admission to public universities.”
Also, in the factual and procedural history of the case the
Court notes the testimony of Professor Lempert that the
101

See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (“Grutter VI”).
See id. at 2341-42.
103
See id. at 2338-40 (stating that throughout the litigation the Law
School asserted only one justification for the admissions policy, “obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”).
104
See id. at 2331-35. The intervenors were also denied the opportunity to
participate in oral argument at the Supreme Court.
105
Id. at 2335. Also, the majority opinion in Gratz specifically notes that
the Court will not address a past discrimination justification for the
admissions policy because the Law School itself never offered past
discrimination as a reason for adopting the policy. [add citation]
102
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Law School’s 1992 admission policy was not intended as a
remedy to past discrimination, but instead to bring “a
perspective different from that of members of groups which
106
have not been the victims of such discrimination.”

Part II: The Failure of Intervention as A
Procedural Device
Intervention has failed as a procedural device in the
higher education affirmative action cases. In order to
measure the success or failure of intervention in a particular
litigation it is necessary to consider the general policy
107
Higher education
objectives underlying intervention.
affirmative action cases are a classic example of what has
been called public law litigation. As initially described by
Abraham Chayes, public law litigation is litigation in which
the plaintiff’s object is the vindication of constitutional or
108
statutory policies.
The traditional conception of adjudication is private
rights litigation in which private parties seek to settle a
109
The defining features of
dispute regarding private rights.
106

Id. at 2341. The majority opinion, while ignoring the intervenors does
include the arguments and perspectives of other groups, namely the
arguments of amicus curiae business and military leaders. The majority
notes that “major American businesses have made clear that the skills
needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints
. . .What is more, high-ranking retires officers and civilian leaders of the
United States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of
experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is
essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide
national security.” Id. at 2340. (internal citations omitted) (citing Briefs
of 3M Corporation, General Motors Corp., and Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al.)
The majority does not cite the benefits of diversity for minority students
that are outlined by the intervenors in their briefs before the Court.
107
108

See generally,

Abraham Chayes, The Role of The Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1284 (1976); see also Carl Tobias, Standing to
Intervene, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 415, 419 (1991) (stating that public law
litigation is comprised of lawsuits that vindicate social values and affect
large numbers of people); Cindy Vreeleand, Public Interest Groups, Public
Law Litigation, and Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279, 279-80
(1990) (arguing that due to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the passage of legislation creating statutory rights and remedies has
increased the situations in which courts are called upon to render
judgment affecting a large number of persons).
109
Chayes, supra note 108 at 1282.
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private law litigation are a bi-polar structure, the dispute
focuses on an identified set or prior events, the judgment is
confined to the parties, and the lawsuit is initiated by a
110
In
private party and controlled by the private parties.
contrast, in public law litigation the bi-polar structure of
litigation has given way to suit involving multiple parties,
111
The judges also
most notably class action litigation.
engage in what is known as legislative fact finding, in which
the judge will attempt to gather evidence about an entire
system such as a state’s prison system or school system,
instead of gathering facts that pertain just to the named
112
parties in the litigation. Also, in public law litigation
remedies are focused not just on the dispute between the
parties, but on remedies that are forward looking and effect
large numbers of people in society, such as desegregation
113
orders.
In public law litigation, public interest groups often
seek to intervene to advocate and protect the rights of third
parties that may be affected by the court’s decision that will
define the contours of a particular statutory or
114
In a common public law litigation
constitutional right.
110

Id. at 1282-83.
See id. at 1291.
112
See id. at 1297 (“In public law litigation, then, factfinding is principally
concerned with ‘legislative’ rather than the ‘adjudicative’ fact); Tobias,
supra note __ at 420 (“In institutional reform cases, for example, courts
may undertake major responsibility for fact-gathering, even appointing
adjuncts such as special masters, to fulfill what essentially are ‘quasilegislative’ or ‘quasi-administrative’ decisional duties.”).
113
See id. at 1294 (“The liability determination is not simply a
pronouncement of the legal consequences of past events, but to some
extent a prediction of what is likely to be in the future. And relief is not a
terminal, compensatory transfer, but an effort to devise a program to
contain future consequences in a way that accommodates the range of
interests involved.”); Tobias, supra note ____ at 419-20 (public law
litigants seek remedies to vindicate rights and interests that are
“abstract, ideological, collective or public in character”).
114
See Ernest Shaver, Intervention in the Public Interest under Rule
24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1549, 1558-59 (1988) (public interest groups seek to intervene to defend
policies or legislation consistent with the group’s objectives); Carl Tobias,
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 Cornell
L. Rev. 270 (1989) (arguing that the concept of interest under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24(a)(2) is important to public interest organization because they
represent large numbers of people who have interests that may seem
individually insubstantial or intangible); Vreelend, supra note __ at 283
(public interest groups intervene to represent outsiders in litigation that
111
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scenario, the government may seek to enforce
administrative regulations against an industrial company
and the Sierra Club or other environmental group will seek
to intervene in order to protect the interest of citizens
interested in protecting the environmental resources of the
community affected by the alleged Clean Air Act
115
violations. Due to the special role for intervenors in public
will have a broad impact beyond the parties to the case).
115
There are numerous examples of public interest groups intervening as
a matter of right per Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a). E.g., U.S. v. City of L.A., 288 F.3d
391 (9th Cir. 2002)(affirming district courts denial of ACLU’s motion to
intervene in a consent decree between the United States and the city of
Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police Department, and the Los Angeles
Board of Police Commissioners); Clark v. Putnam County, 168 F.3d 458
(11th Cir. 1999) (finding that the Georgia State Conference of NAACP
Branches had rebutted the presumption that the named defendants, who
had the same objectives in the litigation as the NAACP, would adequately
represent the NAACP’s interests, and remanding for consideration
whether the NAACP had standing to intervene as defendants, which the
9th Circuit noted was suggestive but not dispositive in determining the
intervenor’s interest in the controversy); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295
(8th Cir. 1996)(allowing the North Star Chapter of the Sierra Club to
intervene with other like-minded groups as defendants in an action
seeking to keep various areas in the Voyageurs National Park open to
snowmobiles); Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825
(9th Cir. 1996)(holding that the Sierra Club and others forming the
Oregon Natural Resources Council could not intervene in litigation
between a timber industry trade group and the United States Department
of Agriculture).
The courts of appeals have put forth various guideposts for public
interest groups wishing to intervene as a matter of right. See, e.g.,
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002)(saying
that even if the federal government defendant discontinues its opposition
to a plaintiffs position and does not appeal any court ruling in a plaintiffs
favor, a private party may still seek intervenor status to take up appeals
as intervenor-defendants); U.S. v. City of L.A., 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir.
2002)(noting that the circuit permits intervention in consent decrees, even
where the consent decree is finalized prior to judicial approval of the
intervention, with the understanding that intervention is not retroactive
and intervenors will only be allowed to participate in post-decree activity);
Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir.
1996)(stating in dictum that a public interest group has a better chance of
successfully intervening if they were involved in the enactment of the law
or administrative proceeding in question).
It is not only large, well-funded public interest organizations that
seek intervention, often local community groups also seem intervenor
status. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Ill. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engars., 101 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1996)(denying a group of residents in
Bartlett, Ill., permission to intervene as defendants in litigation relating
to the Corps of Engineers denial of a permit to build a waste disposal
facility); Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467 (6th Cir.
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law litigation, the policy concerns underlying intervention in
these suits are clear.
Four policy reasons are typically given for the
presence of intervenors in public law litigation: (1) assisting
the court in information gathering and providing expertise:
(2) judicial economy; (3) preventing injury to nonparties; and
(4) adding legitimacy to the court’s decision.
Many
commentators in examining the role of intervention in public
law litigation have identified, all or some of these four policy
116
Courts have also recognized these four
consideration.
policy considerations when deciding whether to allow
117
intervention in public law.
First, many commentators and courts have insisted
that intervenors provide valuable assistance to the courts in
public law litigation by providing additional facts and
expertise needed to make the complex choices and decisions
118
Intervention under this
inherent in public law litigation.
theory operates as a procedural device for courts to gather
additional information not provided to them by the parties,
and receive expert testimony to assist the court in making
and fair and accurate determination of the factual and legal
issues. Under this policy consideration the intervenor is
2000)(affirming the district courts denial of motion to intervene by the
Wilderness Association, a group comprising three local environmental
groups and a local resident).
116
See infra notes 112, 115, and 117 and accompanying text.
117
See supra note 109.
118
See Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial
Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 Ga. L. Rev.
701 (1977-1978) (“The informational input of intervenors can help the
court’s factfinding and law determination and thus enrich the quality of
litigation.”);
James, supra note ___ at 42 (stating that intervention
expands the information available to a court attempting to decide the
merits of the lawsuit); Gene R. Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right–
Toward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 894,
909 (1979-1980) (explaining that courts should consider the opportunity
intervention provides for the court to gather additional data and evidence
to make possible a more just or accurate decision); Tobias, Public Law
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note __ at 443
(because the court’s decision in public law litigation will have a broad
impact judges will need “a broad range of expertise, information, and
perspectives to render the most accurate determinations.”); Vreeland,
supra note ___ at 300 (“[Intervention] may promote better decisions by
ensuring that critical information is available to the court. The original
parties will not always produce the information necessary for just and
accurate results; important information may be disadvantageous to both
sides, of no concern to either, or too technical to be within their grasp.”).
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similar to an amicus curiae in that they are participating in
the law suit to assist the court in its decisionmaking. The
information
gathering
policy
consideration
also
contemplated that there will be information that the
intervenors have, which the parties themselves may be
incapable or uninterested in providing to the court
themselves.
Intervention as a procedural device to aid the court in
information gathering failed in the recent affirmative action
cases. In Grutter, the district court, Sixth Circuit and
Supreme Court failed to utilize in any significant way the
119
The
information given to the courts by the intervenors.
district court was the only court to address the intervenors’
120
The district court however, failed to
evidence directly.
121
incorporate the evidence in the decision making process.
The district court approached the intervenors’ legal
arguments and evidence as a completely separate and
distinct from the original parties’ arguments.122
The district court failed to use the evidence presented
by the intervenors’ to aid in its determination of what the
court determined to be the central issues in the case,
whether diversity is a compelling government interest and
whether the Law School’s admissions policy was narrowly
123
For example, the district court
tailored to meet this goal.
concluded that the Law School’s policy was not narrowly
tailored because the policy failed to explain why the Law
School singled out African-Americans, Hispanics, and native
Americans for the policy instead of groups such as Arabs
and southern and eastern Europeans who had also suffered
124
The intervenors provided testimony
from discrimination.
that would explain the designation of these groups, by
pointing out that all three groups disproportionately reside
and attend schools in impoverished areas of the United
125
Instead of using the evidence presented by the
States.
intervenors to aid the court in its decisionmaking, the
district court in Grutter elected to separate (segregate) the
119

See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87.
121
See id. and accompanying text.
122
See id.
123
See Grutter III, supra note 10, at 36-54.
124
See id. at 51-53.
125
See id. at 75.
120
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intervenors’ arguments from its central decisionmaking in
126
the case. The district court’s treatment of the intervenors’
arguments signals the court’s failure use the intervenors’
information as an integrated part of its decisionmaking
process.
The most prominent policy reason underlying
intervention is the need to protect the interest of third
127
Since the
parties that are not present in the lawsuit.
inception of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 both courts and commentators
have heralded intervention as an important procedural
device to ensure that third parties that may be affected by
the outcome of litigation are allowed to be heard by the
128
court. In the realm of public law litigation, and specifically
affirmative action litigation intervention was seen as
necessary to allow minority students who would be affected
by the outcome of the litigation an opportunity to be heard
129
by the courts. Despite this goal that intervention will give
an outside party a procedural method to protect their
interests in the litigation, intervenors remain outsiders in
the litigation.
This is largely explained by the fact that the trial and
appellate courts in higher education affirmative action
cases, even after intervention, have treated the litigation as
130
In Johnson,
a private litigation bi-polar type enterprise.
Gratz, and Grutter the original parties to the lawsuit, the
126

See id. at 59.
See Kennedy, supra note __, at 334 (intervention as a matter of right
permitted to protect interest of nonparties); Ernest Shaver, Intervention
in the Public Interest Under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 45 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1549, 1570 (1989); Tobias, Public Law
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note __, at 32829 (intervention provides a valuable opportunity for third parties to
participate in litigation that could adversely affect their interests); Vern
R. Walker, Note, The Timeliness Threat to Intervention as a Matter of
Right, 89 Yale L.J. 586, 587 (stating that intervention of right is intended
to serve the policy goal of minimizing injustice to nonparties).
128
See supra note 121.
129
See infra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
130
See generally Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, supra note 50, at 327-29. Tobias argues that the courts’
development of the four considerations for intervention as a matter of
right have adversely affected public interest litigants that seek to
intervene. Id. at 327. Tobias explains that the intervention of right
standard reflects a “private law” brand of judicial thinking and courts
continue to apply the intervention rule public law litigation as if it were
private litigation. Id. at 328.
127
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plaintiff and university defendant, constructed the
framework of the litigation and the courts responded to this
131
The original parties asked the courts to
framework.
address a single question, whether under the Fourteenth
Amendment was the university is entitled to use race a
factor in admissions in order to enhance the diversity of the
student body at the university, and as a result courts have
made the diversity justification the central issue in all of
132
these cases.
The intervenors attempted to broaden the framework
of the litigation by including additional justifications for the
race conscious admissions program, namely past
discrimination and the discriminatory effects of current
The trial and appellate courts
admissions criteria.133
essentially rejected the intervenors attempts to add or
contribute additional information outside of the framework
set up by the plaintiff and defendant.134 In this way, the
court reacted to the intervenors’ arguments in the same
mode of a private rights litigation.
This attempt by the trial and appellate courts to limit
the framework or scope of the litigation by ignoring the facts
and legal arguments presented by the intervenors is a
displacement of the balance of interests that should be
considered upon a motion to intervene. The district court
considering a motion to intervene should balance the
interests of the original parties and the court in a
131

See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-70 (analyzing UGA admissions
policy only based on the diversity rationale); Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1264
(providing minimal analysis of intervenors’ past discrimination rationale);
Grutter IV, 288 F.3d at 739 (stating that the court would only address the
issue of whether diversity is a compelling government interest); Grutter V,
123 S.Ct. at 2334 (addressing only the diversity justification and stating
that the university never offered past discrimination as a rationale for its
admissions policy); Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2420, n.9 (refusing to address
past discrimination rationale because university denied that this was a
justification for the admissions policy).
132
See id.
133 See Defendant-Intervenors’ Final Brief, supra note 87, at 40-43
(stating that racial integration of the schools is a compelling state
interest, and affirmative action is the sole means of continuing racial
integration at the University of Michigan Law School).
134 See notes 94-101 and the accompanying text; Defendant-Intervenors’
Final Brief, supra note 87, at 39 (“The district court never engaged with
either side of the fundamentality of race—not with the students’
arguments about racism and meritocracy and not with their arguments
for integration, diversity, and progress.”).
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streamlined, less complex litigation with the interest of the
intervenors in offering additional information and legal
theories to the court to enhance the court’s ability to make a
more accurate determination of the legal and factual
135
However, once the court has decided that the
issues.
interests weigh in favor of allowing intervention, the court
should seek to utilize intervention as a procedural device,
and consider the evidence and legal arguments presented by
the intervenors as a guide and an aid to the court.
The test for intervention as a matter of right under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) requires that the intervenors be able to
demonstrate that the part on whose side they wish to
136
intervene will not adequately represent their interests.
The requirement that an intervenor must demonstrate
inadequate representation is often said to be a minimal
burden, but the proposed intervenor must demonstrate that
137
its interest are not identical to that of the existing parties.
Thus, the Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) contemplates and demands
that intervenors will bring a unique perspective to the
litigation. Despite this requirement we see courts ignoring
the unique interests that the intervenors were required to
have to gain entry to the litigation. Essentially, the rule
requires certain criteria for entry to the litigation but once
inside the litigation the rules and our courts offer no answer
to the intervenors’ interests and concerns. This lack of
symmetry between the entrance requirements and outcome
may explain why courts have lowered the standard for
135

See John E. Kennedy, Let’s All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule
24, 57 Ky. L. J. 329, 334 (1969) (stating that intervention as a matter of
right is a recognition by the court that the interest of the intervenors and
absence of any effective outside remedy outweighs the interests of the
original parties to control their own litigation).
136
See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972)
(requiring proposed intervenors to demonstrate that the plaintiff may
inadequately represent the interests of the proposed intervenors);
Katharine Goepp, Note, Presumed Represented: Analyzing Intervention as
of Right when the Government is a Party, 24 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 131, 140
(discussing the special standard for adequate representation when the
government is a party).
137
See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.074[4], 24-71 (stating that in order
to meet the inadequate representation requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)
the proposed intervenors must show that their interests differ from the
parties’ interests); Shaver, supra note __ at 1555 (explaining that in order
to meet the inadequate representation test proposed intervenors must
show that their interests conflict with the parties’ interest, the parties will
not vigorously represent their interests).
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intervenors’ to demonstrate that their interest is not
adequately represented. Perhaps the lower requirements
are an acknowledgment by the courts that although
intervenors are formally allowed into the litigation there
will be little actual role for them as an influence in the
Court’s decisionmaking.
A court’s lower requirements for intervention and
subsequent marginalization of the intervenor perspective is
apparent in Grutter. The Sixth Circuit in overturning the
district court’s denial of the intervenor applicant’s motion to
intervene points to the relatively low requirements for the
intervenors to demonstrate that they have a substantial
interest in the litigation, and that their interest in the
litigation would not be adequately represented by the
University defendants. The court stated: “The proposed
intervenors must show that they have a substantial interest
in the subject matter of this litigation. However, in this
circuit we subscribe to a ‘rather expansive notion of the
interest sufficient to invoke intervention of right. For
example, an intervenor need not have the same standing
138
The court clearly
necessary to initiate a lawsuit.”
separates the status and role of the intervenor from those of
the plaintiff and defendant.
The Court’s clear recognition that intervenors need
not have the same standing or interests as an actual party
to the litigation leads to the intervenors being largely
ignored during the actual decisionmaking. In Grutter, one
member of the Sixth Circuit points directly to the
intervenors’ status as a reason to ignore their interests.
The Law School’s disavowal is why I do not discuss
whether the remediation of past discrimination is a
compelling state interest that could justify the Law
School’s actions. Not only must a state interest be
compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny, but it also must be the
interest that motivated the classification in the first
instance.139

The Supreme Court’s position amounts to a demand
that in the context of Equal Protection analysis, and

138
139

Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 398.
Grutter IV, 288 F.3d at 795, fn. 17 (J. Boggs, dissenting).
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defendant-intervenor’s arguments related to the compelling
state interest must be endorsed by the defendant. This
conflicts with Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) demand that the
intervenors’ arguments not be adequately represented by
the party on whose side they seek to intervene.
Another policy goal for intervention is to encourage
140
Similar
judicial economy by consolidating related issues.
to arguments that favor other joinder devices such as fed. R.
Civ. P. 19, and the class action rules of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23,
intervention should allow a court to address all of the facts
and legal arguments surrounding an issue to prevent later
litigation of related issues. In the affirmative action cases
intervention has failed to provide a resolution of the issue
presented by the intervenors, thus leaving open the
possibility of further litigation regarding past discrimination
as a justification for race conscious admissions policy, and
the alleged discriminatory effects of current admissions
criteria.
In Grutter and Gratz the intervenors and district
courts expended considerable resources in the presentation
of the intervenors’ unique factual and legal issues.
However, due to the failure of the appellate court to fully
address the intervenors arguments those resources were
wasted.
Finally, intervention has also arguably been said to
lend legitimacy the decisions of courts by allowing third
141
In Grutter
parties input in the process of the litigation.
and Gratz, at varying levels the decisions of the trial and
appellate courts were questioned by the intervenors who
argued that the courts ignored their input.142 In Grutter, the
140

See James, supra note __, at 42 (stating that intervention allows courts
to consolidate related issues); Shaver, supra note __, at 1570 (explaining
that commentators note that intervention assists courts in adjudicating
disputes more efficiently by combining two or more claims into a single
action).
141
See Tobias, Standing to Intervene, supra note __ at 444 (“In
institutional reform, and much additional public law litigation, citizen
participation in the form of intervention might promote governmental
accountability for its decisionmaking and could make both the
governmental decision and the judicial determination more palatable to
those who must live with them”); Vreeland, supra note ___ at 300 (stating
that judicial decisions that affect widespread interests may be more likely
to be viewed as illegitimate if courts fail to give the public a right to be
heard through intervention).
142 See supra note 87 and accompanying text; Jeremy Berkwoitz, Mich.
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intervenors questioned the district court’s willingness to
involve the intervenors in its decisionmaking process
stating: “The district court never engaged with either side of
the fundamentality of race—not with the students’
arguments about racism and meritocracy and not with their
arguments for integration, diversity, and progress.”143 The
presence of the intervenors in the recent affirmative action
cases has failed to lend legitimacy to the courts’ decisions
due to the courts’ failure to sufficiently address the
intervenors’ evidence and legal arguments in the
decisionmaking in the case.
In the specific context of affirmative action higher
education litigation the predominant argument regarding
intervention has been that minority students have a
significant vested interest in preserving affirmative action
admissions programs, and intervention provides the best
procedural device for minority students to protect their
144
In an article
interest in affirmative action litigation.
published almost twenty-five years ago, Emma Coleman
Jones argued that in affirmative action litigation such as
145
Bakke no party in the lawsuit directly represented the
146
Jones
interests of minority students and applicants.
argued that intervention is the best procedural device for
correcting the absence of minority representation in higher

Daily, March 11, 2003 (attorney for Grutter intervenors criticizes Supreme
Court’s denial of time for intervenors to participate in oral argument
stating that the Court would be unable to hear crucial evidence regarding
racial bias and inequality in the admission process).
143 See Defendant-Intervenors’ Final Brief, supra note 87, at 39.
144
See Jones, supra note ___ at 34 (arguing that minority interest groups
should be granted intervention of right in affirmative action litigation,
and that intervention has great potential to “safeguard” minority interests
in defending affirmative action programs); Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding
the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the Defense of Civil Rights
Remedies, 4 Mich. J. Race & L. 263, 268-69 (1999) (intervention by
affirmative action beneficiaries is appropriate in most affirmative action
cases and minority students have the only unencumbered interest in
defending affirmative action policies); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views
of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 928, 967-68 (2001) (asserting that the intervenors in the
Michigan affirmative action cases are an important voice for
“transformative politics,” the notion that the goal of affirmative action
should ultimately be ending the subordination of people of color.)
145
Bakke, 98 S.Ct. at 2757.
146
Jones, supra note 8, at 31.
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education affirmative action cases.147 Jones suggests that
courts are more likely to uphold affirmative action policies if
intervenors participate in the litigation as a voice for
“minority-group interests.”148
More recently, other commentators have identified the
goals of intervention if higher education affirmative action
litigation. In a recent article Charles Lawrence states that
intervenors provide a valuable critique of the “liberal
defense of affirmative action,” commonly known as the
“diversity defense.”149 Lawrence argues that diversity has
become the dominant rationale for affirmative action
programs offered by universities and others attempting to
preserve affirmative action.150 Lawrence argues that the
intervenors are attempting to engage in the promotion of
“transformative politics,” the notion that in the debate over
affirmative action beyond the winning and losing of a
particular case is the need to change political consciousness
and highlight the need for the end of racial inequality.151 He
says “the intervenors have taken a first step in that the true
victims’ voices be heard and in subverting the legal fiction
that only recognizes injury to the white plaintiffs and makes
the University a defender, never a violator, of minority
rights.”
The intervenors themselves have also identified the
roles they seek to play in these cases. The intervenors view
the procedural process of intervention in higher education
affirmative action cases as a mechanism for promoting the
end of racial inequality in society and expanding
147 See id. at 32 (arguing that intervention is one of the procedural devices

available to correct the absence of minority representation in higher
education affirmative action cases).
148 Id. at 33.
149 Lawrence, supra note 141, at 931.
150 Id. (“I argue that as diversity has emerged as the dominant defense of
affirmative action in the university setting, it has pushed other more
radical substantive defenses to the background.”).
151 See id. at 965-66 (“Transformative politics requires looking beyond winning or
losing the particular legal dispute or political battle and asking how one’s actions
serve to reinforce people’s awareness of our interdependence and mutual
responsibility as members of the human family. . .The task is to help the privileged
comprehend the profound costs associated with inequality—the public costs of
prisons, crime, illiteracy, disease, and the violence of an alienated underclass—as
well as the personal costs of loneliness and anomie in a world where no one is
responsible for the pain of any other person.”)
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opportunities for minorities in higher education.152 In their
view, the protection of their interests begins with voicing
their unique perspective or story regarding race-conscious
153
admissions policies during the course of the litigation.
As identified by Jones, Lawrence, and the intervenors
themselves, the goals of minority students and public
interest groups that seek intervention in these cases are
two-fold:
interest goals and narrative goals.
The
intervenors seek to protect their interests, namely
successfully defending race-conscious admissions policies.154
The intervenors also have a narrative goal to have their
voices be heard, and in doing so to steer the affirmative
action admissions debate in courts and in public discourse
away from diversity and instead to remedying past
discrimination and racial stratification.155
The recent higher education affirmative action cases
indicate that intervention is largely failing as a procedural
device for providing intervenors a method to meet these two
goals of protecting their interests, and meaningfully convey
their unique narrative.
First, in some recent higher
152

Miranda Massie, DET. FREE PRESS, January 17, 2001, (attorney for
Grutter intervenors stating that “[S]tudent intervenors will give questions
of racist inequality, bias and unfairness their proper emphasis. The
pernicious and stultifying myth of race-neutral meritocracy will finally be
dispelled.”); Katie Plona, MICH. DAILY, Feb. 6, 1998, at 1 (attorney for
Citizens for Affirmative Actions Preservation explaining that the
intervenors “have a direct and significant interest in preserving an
admissions policy that broadens access to the University, including the
University’s authority to consider how a student’s racial background has
affected his or her experiences.”); Peter Schmidt, Minority Students Win
Right to Intervene in Lawsuit Attacking Affirmative Action, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 3, 1999, at A68 (lawyer for Gratz and Grutter
intervenors stating that intervention is necessary because “[i]t has been
activism by students– always–that has been responsible for the expansion
of opportunity at the University of Michigan . . . it has never been the
university acting on its own.”).
153
Massie, supra note __ (“ . . .the participation of student intervenors in
the case gives us a chance for something more. The trail in the U-M Law
School case will change the terms of the [affirmative action] debate and
will correct serious flaws in the approach of recent decisions.” Schmidt,
supra note __ at A68 (attorney for intervenors stating that intervention
“means that black and other minority students will be able to bring into
the courtroom the truth about continuing inequality and racism and bias
in higher education.”);
154 See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors’ Brief in Support of Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 80, at 1-3 (urging court to
uphold the Law School’s admissions policy).
155 See infra note and accompanying text.
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education affirmative action cases intervention has failed to
provide intervenors with a method of protecting their
interest goal of preserving race-conscious admissions
programs for the purpose of remedying racial inequalities.
In Hopwood where the Fifth Circuit struck down the
race-conscious admissions policy, the intervenors were
denied intervenor status.156 In applying the standard for
intervention as a matter of right, the district and appellate
courts wrongly equated the university’s narrative with the
minority students’ narrative, thus finding that the
university would adequately represent the proposed
intervenors’ interests.157 The court viewed the University’s
narrative simply as a story about the defense of a raceconscious admissions program, assuming that the
University will work vigorously not to be found to have
158
established and promoted an unconstitutional policy. The
Fifth Circuit’s initial decision to deny intervention in the
case, was later noted by one judge on the Fifth Circuit as a
key error in the court’s attempt to render a thoughtful
decision on the merits of the case itself: “As to the request to
intervene, what class of persons is more qualified to adduce
the evidence of the present effects of past discrimination
159
than current and prospective black law students?”
In Johnson and Gratz, although the intervenors are
present in the case, the courts failed to uphold the raceconscious admissions policy.160 In both of these cases the
Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court respectively found, the
admissions policies unconstitutional without a full
consideration of the intervenors’ primary contention that the
race-conscious policies were justified as remedies for past
discrimination UGA and the University of Michigan.161
156 See notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
157 Hopwood I, 21 F.3d at 606 (“The proposed intervenors have not

demonstrated that the State will not strongly defend its affirmative action
program.”)
158
Id.
159
th
Hopwood v. State of Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 725 (5 Cir. 1996) (“Hopwood
III”) (Stewart, dissenting).
160 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1244 (affirming district court’s finding that
UGA’s race conscious admissions policy was unconstitutional); Gratz III,
123 S.Ct. at 2417 (holding that LSA’s admissions policy violated both the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act).
161 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1264 (dismissing in one paragraph the
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Intervention has also largely failed to allow the
intervenors’ meaningful opportunity to meet their narrative
goal to have their voices heard by the courts. This is evident
primarily from the fact that in Johnson, Grutter, and Gratz
the courts failed to engage the intervenors’ narrative
without an endorsement of that narrative by the university
defendant.162 In this way, the courts essentially demand
that the intervenors’ narrative be the same as the university
defendant in order for the court to recognize the narrative as
one of central relevance or importance.
In Grutter and Gratz the intervention fails to provide
the intervenors with a meaningful opportunity to be heard,
because the courts insist that the intervenors’ narrative
mirror the narrative of the university defendant. In Grutter,
the University refused to put forth past discrimination as a
163
Instead, the Law
justification for its admissions policy.
School offered a drastically different vision of the advent of
its admissions policy. While the intervenors claimed that
the framework for the policy arose from campus protests by
African-American students to encourage “educational
equality,” the Law School claimed that the admissions policy
arose solely from the Law School’s commitment to enroll
164
students with different perspectives.
Also, in contrast to the intervenors’ evidence regarding
past discrimination, the Law School offered no testimony
intervenors’ past discrimination contention); Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2420,
n. 9 (rejecting in a single footnote the intervenors’ argument that LSA’s
programs had a remedial justification).
162 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1264 (stating that there was little
persuasive evidence in the record to support a remedial justification, in
part because UGA rejected the position that its policy was motivated by a
need to remediate past discrimination); Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2420, n. 9
(“The District Court considered and rejected respondent-intervenors’ [past
discrimination] argument . . . We agree, and to the extent respondentintervenors reassert this justification, a justification the University has
never asserted throughout the course of this litigation, we affirm the
District Court’s disposition of the issue.”)
163
See Grutter IV, 288 F.3d at 735 (‘The Law School contends that its
interest in achieving a diverse student body is compelling . . . [t]he
Intervenors offer an additional justification for the Law School’s
consideration of race and ethnicity–remedying past discrimination.”)
164
See Grutter IV, 288 F.3d at 737 (“Professor Richard Lempert, the chair
of the faculty committee that drafted the admissions policy, explained
that the Law School’s commitment to such diversity was not intended as a
remedy for past discrimination, but as a means of including students who
may bring a different perspective to the Law School.”)
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regarding past racial or ethnic discrimination by the Law
School or the University of Michigan.165 The Law School
instead presented evidence focused solely on diversity as a
The Law School
justification for affirmative action.166
presented the testimony of current and former University of
Michigan professors and administrators to testify about the
pedagogical value of diversity, and the focus of the
admissions policy to admit a diverse class without the use of
167
quotas. The Law School also presented detailed testimony
regarding the 1992 admissions policy at issue in the
lawsuit.168 The law school also presented an expert witness
to statistically substantiate the Law School’s claim that no
quota or numerical goal was used in the admissions
policy.169
The Law School’s refusal to adopt the intervenors’
past discrimination analysis may be explained by several
factors. First, the Law School claimed that the faculty
committee which conceived of the policy, and later the full
faculty that adopted the admissions policy never considered
past discrimination as a justification for the admissions
policy. Instead, as stated in the policy itself the Law School
claimed that the policy was solely justified by the Law
School’s goal “to admit a group of students who individually
and collectively are among the most capable students
applying to American law schools in a given year . . .
Collectively, we seek a mix of students with varying
backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn
170
The Law School policy also specifically
from each other.”
indicates an emphasis on racial and ethnic diversity:

165See Grutter III, supra note 76, at 4-36 (giving detail recount of

witnesses presented by the Law School, all of whom testified regarding
admissions procedure or the development of admissions policy to foster a
diverse student body).
166 See id.
167
See, Trial Outline infra note ___ at 6. Lee Bollinger, president of the
University of Michigan in 2001, Professor Richard Lempert of the Law
School, and then dean of the Law School, Jeffrey Lehman, all testified on
behalf of the University as to the diversity justification for the Law
School’s admissions policy.
168 See id.
169 See Id. at
170
Grutter III, supra note 76, at 5 (citing Michigan Law School’s 1992
Admissions Policy at 1).
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There is, however, a commitment to one particular type of
diversity that the school has long had and which should
continue. This is a commitment to racial and ethnic
diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students
from groups which have been historically discriminated
against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native
Americans, who without this commitment might not be
represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.
These students are particularly likely to have experiences
and perspectives of special importance to our mission.171

Based on the text of the 1992 admissions policy itself,
and the testimony of the Law School administrators and
faculty that developed the policy there can be little doubt
that the goal of maintaining racial and ethnic diversity was
a motivating factor in the development of the 1992
admissions policy. However, it is also just as likely that the
Law School began considering race and ethnicity as a factors
in its admissions policy as a direct response to both societal
discrimination and discrimination by the University of
Michigan itself. As mentioned in the Law School policy, by
the time the 1992 admissions policy was developed the Law
School “over the past two decades” preceding the 1992 policy
was already making efforts to increase the numbers of
certain minority groups at the Law School. The Law
School’s use of race and ethnicity as a consideration in
172
In 1975, the Law School
admissions traces back to 1966.
adopted a formal admissions policy stating that the Law
School should seek to enroll African-Americans, Hispanic
students, and Native Americans as 10-12% of the entering
class. The reason for this numerical goal was stated as “the
Law School recognizes the racial imbalance now existing in
the legal profession and the public interest in increasing the
number of lawyers from ethnic and cultural minorities

171

Id. at 9 (citing Michigan Law School’s 1992 Admissions Policy at 9).
See id. at 13, fn. 8. The district court referenced a trial exhibit entitled
“The History of Special Admissions at the University of Michigan Law
School, 1966-81.” This document recounts the history of the Law School’s
efforts to enroll minority students. In 1966, the law school faculty began
to give preference to African-American students and students from
“disadvantaged backgrounds” for admissions off the waiting list due to the
faculty’s concern about the small numbers of African-American students
enrolling at the Law School.
172
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significantly underrepresented in the profession.”173
The Law School’s initial focus on the need to address
“racial imbalance” in the legal profession is much more
closely akin to the argument that race conscious admissions
policies are needed to cure societal discrimination. Curing
racial imbalance is not an attempt to improve the classroom
environment or capitalize on different perspectives that may
be offered by students of certain racial and ethnic minority
groups. Instead, the Law School was attempting to correct
numerical differences in the number of minorities attending
the Law School, and joining the legal profession. This
original statement of purpose by the Law School resembles
the intervenors claims that the current consideration of race
by the Law School is necessary to insure that the law School
does not become “resegregated.” In the intervenors’ current
narrative and the previous incarnations of the Law School’s
admissions policies, preventing resegregation and ending
racial imbalance is a goal unto itself, separate from creating
a racially diverse law school environment.
Therefore, looking at the Law School’s admissions
policy from a broader perspective demonstrates that
diversity was not the only justification for the Law School’s
use of race in its admissions program. The Law School’s
abandonment of the past discrimination rationale may be
explained a number of considerations. The Law School in its
litigation strategy may have concluded that a past
discrimination rationale was unlikely to provide a sufficient
basis for the courts to find the use of race to meet the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. In affirmative
action cases over the last quarter century the Supreme
Court has consistently rejected remedying general societal
discrimination as a justification for the use of race in
admissions, hiring, and government contracting.
The courts in Johnson, Grutter, and Gratz failed to
acknowledge the reason that the university defendant would
avoid adopting the intervenors’ past discrimination
narrative, namely because this story implicates the
university in past and ongoing racial discrimination. 174
173

Id. at 13 (citing University of Michigan Law School’s 1988-89 Law
School Announcement at 85-86).
174 See Lawrence, supra note 107, at 956 (“Perhaps the University’s
rejection of the remedial defense can be explained by its concern that by
admitting its own discriminatory practices it would expose itself to
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The argument can be made that while the intervenors’
narrative was never adopted by any of the courts deciding
Grutter or Gratz, aspects of the intervenors’ narrative were
heard, because elements of the narrative are interwoven in
the Court’s decisions. Although not attributed to the
intervenors, Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Grutter
adopts a similar perspective to that of the intervenors’
narrative regarding the unitary nature of a state’s
educational system by highlighting the place of affirmative
action in society’ attempt to equalize educational
175
opportunity for students of all races in ethnicity.
Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority’s observation
that “race-conscious programs” must have a “logical end
point” will be more of a consideration over the next
generation
as
society
makes
progress
towards
176
nondiscrimination and “genuinely equal opportunity.”
Similar to arguments made by the intervenors regarding the
need for race conscious solutions to remedy continuing racial
discrimination, Justice Ginsburg notes that currently
“conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank
discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land,
177
impeding realization of our highest values and ideals.”
Justice Ginsburg also cited statistics that are reflective
of the unitary education aspect of the intervenors’ narrative.
Justice Ginsburg recognizes that as of 2000-2001 71.6% of
African-American children and 76.3% of Hispanic children
attended a school in which minorities made up a majority of
the student body, and that “many minority students
encounter markedly inadequate and unequal educational
178
Justice Ginsburg only connects her
opportunities.”
evidence regarding segregation and inequality in elementary
and secondary schools with her argument that the time has
not yet arrived to sunset affirmative action programs. Thus,
while Justice Ginsburg does not acknowledge the
intervenors narrative related to current discrimination and
the inequality of educational opportunities as a basis for the
Law School’s affirmative action, these elements are present
in her concurrence thus providing some recognition of the
liability vis-vis minority applicants and students.”
175
See Grutter V, supra note __ at 2347-48 (J. Ginsburg, concurring).
176
Id. (J. Ginsburg, concurring).
177
Id. at 2347.
178
Id.
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intervenors’ perspective.
The intervenors’ narrative theme of the inherent
unfairness of the use of LSAT scores as a dominant
admissions criteria also found recognition in the unlikely
179
quarter of the dissent of Justice Thomas.
Justice Thomas
rejects the majority opinion’s conclusion that the Law
School’s use of race in admissions leads to educational
180
Justice Thomas critiques the
benefits for all students.
concept of selective admissions, stating that “there is
nothing ancient, honorable, or constitutionally protected
181
He argues that law schools
about ‘selective’ admissions.”
have known that African-American students perform
relatively worse on the LSAT than Caucasian students, yet
the law schools continue to use the test as an admissions
criteria, and then consider race to “correct for black
underperformance by using racial discrimination in
182
admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic student body.”
This argument is similar to the one made by the
183
The
intervenors regarding the use of the LSAT and GPA.
intervenors argued that the use of the LSAT without adding
the explicit consideration of race, amounts to a racially
184
biased admissions system. The intervenors also presented
testimony that attempted to demonstrate that the LSAT is
185
At bottom, much of the intervenors
racially biased.
questioning of the use of LSAT and GPA is an attack on the
179

See id. at 2360-61 (“The Law School’s continued adherence to [the
LSAT] it knows produces racially skewed results is not entitled to
deference by this Court.”)
180
Id. at 2357.
Ironically, although Justice Thomas’s critique of
admissions criteria mirrors the intervenors’ arguments, he fails to
acknowledge the arguments of the intervenors in the portion of his
opinion in which he argues that affirmative action programs “stamp
minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to
preferences.” Id. at 2361. The intervenors include a minority students
who, as current students at LSA and the Law School, were “beneficiaries”
of affirmative action.
None of these students corroborate Justice
Thomas’s assertion that beneficiaries feel either entitled or inferior due to
affirmative action programs. Justice Thomas fails to acknowledge the
testimony by minority students in Grutter, which dispute his claims of
stigma related to affirmative action.
181
Id. at 2360.
182
Id.
183
See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
184
See id.
185
See id.

2003]

NARRATIVE HIGHGROUND

47

current system of selective admissions. The intervenors are
essentially stating that the current “neutral” selective
admissions criteria are unable to stand alone without the
186
Although the intervenors would
consideration of race.
obviously disagree with Justice Thomas’s conclusion that it
is constitutionally impermissible to consider race in
admissions, Justice Thomas’s dissent one of the intervenors’
narrative strands which questions other aspects of current
admissions systems beyond the use of race.

Part III: Claiming Narrative Highground :
Addressing the Failure of Intervention as
Procedural Device
Intervention has failed as a procedural device in the
recent affirmative action higher education affirmative action
cases.187 The general policy goals underlying intervention
have not been met in these cases, and the benefits of
intervention said to attach in affirmative action cases have
188
Therefore, minority students and
failed to materialize.
public interest organizations that have served as intervenors
in these cases should abandon intervention as a procedural
device in the continuing legal and public debate surrounding
higher education admissions policies.
Several important issues in the area of higher
education admissions policies remain unresolved by the
189
Grutter
Supreme Court’s holdings in Grutter and Gratz.
and Gratz did not answer the issue of whether public
university’s may employ race-conscious remedies in order to
186

See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants, Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note __ at 29 (“Because tests such as the SAT
and the LSAT measure only a very narrow skill set and correlate poorly
with even narrow measures of future performance, to propose any rigid
use of them as tools for distributing opportunity, rather than as tools for
diagnosing educational needs and designing pedagogical strategies is
illegitimate. Since these tests downgrade the performance of black and
other minority students, the suggestion that they should be used in a rigid
manner is outrageous–it is a knowing proposal for a racist double
standard.”)
187
See supra text accompanying notes 99-117.
188
See supra text accompanying notes 115-118.
189
See Margaret Graham Tebo, New Frontier for Affirmative Action, 2 No.
25 A.B.A.J. E-Report 3 (2003) (stating that while Grutter resolved the
issue of whether diversity is a compelling government interest many of
the questions in the affirmative action area remain unresolved).
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remedy past segregation.190 Also, the Supreme Court failed
to address the Grutter and Gratz intervenors’ argument that
a public university has an affirmative duty under the Equal
Protection Clause to prevent resegregation that would result
if the university relies primarily on standardized test scores
191
and GPA as admissions criteria. The recent cases also did
not address whether a race conscious admission policy may
be justified to remedy ongoing de facto segregation in a
state’s elementary and secondary school system.192 Because
all of these issues remain to be resolved in the area of higher
education admissions policy, minority students and public
interest groups committed to the resolution of these
lingering questions must consider alternatives to
intervention.
Minority students and public interest groups
advocating race-conscious admissions policies as one method
of reversing systemic racial inequality should consider
becoming plaintiffs in lawsuits against public universities to
challenge current admissions policies.193 While these cases
may ultimately prove unsuccessful on their merits the
position as plaintiffs will afford a better opportunity to be
heard than through the procedure of intervention.194
Similar to the litigation strategy adopted by Caucasian
plaintiffs in the affirmative action cases, a minority student
after being rejected from a state university would file suit
against the university challenging its admissions policy.195
190

See Gratz II, supra note ___ at 12, n. 9 (stating that the Court affirmed
the district court’s rejection of the intervenors’ argument that LSA’s race
conscious admission program was justified by past discrimination,
because the University failed to offer past discrimination as a justification
for the program); [Bakke on past segregation]
191
See id.
192 See id; Lawrence, supra note 107, at 946 (arguing that “subordinated minority
children” becoming plaintiffs in a recent lawsuit places “the victims of racism at the
center” of the admission debate).
193 See Rios v. Regents of the Univer. Of Cal., (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1999) (lawsuit in
which minority plaintiffs filed suit against the University of California at Berkeley’s
admissions policies which relied on GPA and standardized test scores); Lawrence,
supra note 107, at 943-46 (citing Rios as an example of litigants challenging “raceneutral” admissions policies such as complete reliance on standardized test scores and
GPA as the criteria for admissions).
194 See supra discussion in Part II regarding the failure of intervention to provide a
meaningful opportunity for the minority student’s narrative to be heard.
195 See supra note 188.
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There is a growing movement among legal scholars
and educators which questions the validity of standardized
196
Presumably the
tests as a legitimate admissions criteria.
university’s admissions program would be primarily based
on the use of standardized tests and GPAs to admit
students.197 The rejected minority applicant would argue
that the use of standardized testing and GPA as the
predominant factor in admissions violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.198 The
argument regarding the inappropriate use of the LSAT and
GPA as admissions standards has already begun to be
litigated. Justice Thomas noted in his dissent in Grutter
that:
The Law School’s continued adherence to measures its
knows produce racially skewed results is not entitled to
deference . . .The Law School itself admits that the test is
imperfect . . .An infinite variety of admissions methods are
196

Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self-Interest? 10
Reasons Why UC-Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (and Why Other Good
Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 594- 95
(2001) (arguing that standardized testing is primarily a lucrative business
for testing corporations instead of a measure for academic success);
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Legal Fiction of Standardized Testing, 21
LAW IN EQ. 397 (2003) (challenging the use of standardized tests through
the narrative of minority students);
Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm,
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 965 (1996) (“In fact,
the dominance of standardized tests in selection is a relatively recent
development.
The civil rights revolution, and the introduction of
affirmative action programs, occurred at the same time that society was
formalizing a ‘meritocracy’ based on education and standardized
testing.”); Lawrence, supra note 107, at 945 (arguing that the University
of California at Berkeley’s admissions procedure rely on standardized
tests in a “determinative and exclusionary way”);
Symposium
Proceedings, Building a Multiracial Social Justice Movement, 27 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 23 (2001- 02) (citing Malcolm Gladwell, The
Examined Life: What Stanley H. Kaplan Taught Us About the S.A.T.,
New Yorker, Dec. 17, 2001, at 86) (professor Gerald Torres noting that
researcher have found that students who would have been rejected for
admission if considering only GPA or standardized tests are
outperforming expectations when admitted under admissions policies that
do not consider standardized test scores).
197 See generally, Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2418-20 (describing LSA’s admissions
procedure which used a student’s GPA and standardized test score to initially classify
all applicants); Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2331-32 (recounting the Law School’s
admissions policy including the Law School’s use of LSAT and GPA as predictors of
academic success).
198 See supra note 188.
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available to the Law School. Considering all of the radical
thinking that has occurred at this country’s universities, the
Law Schools’ intractable approach toward admissions is
striking.199

Also, if the university has an admissions policy, like
that of the University of Michigan Law School, in which race
is a consideration in admissions, the student could also seek
a declaratory judgment that the university’s race conscious
admissions program should be expanded. The minority
student should argue that race conscious admissions
programs must be expanded in order to serve not just as a
method of creating diversity in the school’s enrollment, but
also as a method of remedying past discrimination and
ongoing racial discrimination in the state education
system.200
Some obvious barriers exist to the success of a lawsuit
constructed under these legal theories. First, in regards to
the use of the LSAT and GPA as admissions criteria, while
there may be a gap in LSAT scores and GPAs that correlates
with race, these criteria on their face are race neutral. Also,
arguably the advent of the use of standardized tests and
GPA as admissions criteria may not be able to be traced to a
racially based motive. Therefore, an Equal Protection
challenge to these admissions criteria will likely be subject
201
Under rational basis review
to rational basis review.
courts will ask only whether the university has a rational
basis for employing standardized tests and GPA as
199

Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. 2360-61.

200 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
201

Plaintiffs in recent affirmative action cases have also claimed a cause of action
under Title VI of the 1964 civil rights act. See, e.g., Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2417. The
analysis of a Title VI violation is identical to analysis under the Equal Protection
Clause. See Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2347 (citing Bakke, 483 U.S. at 287). Prior to
2001, under regulations promulgated under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
private plaintiffs could challenge governmental actions which had a disparate impact
based on race, national origin, or ethnicity. In 2001, the Supreme Court in Alexander
v. Sandoval held that these disparate impact regulations may not be enforced through
a private right of action. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
Therefore, potential minority student plaintiffs will likely not have a separate Title VI
disparate impact challenge to facially neutral admissions criteria. But see William C.
Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT creates “Built-In Headwinds”: An Educational
and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 121, 173 (2002)
(describing a viable disparate impact challenge to the use of standardized tests).
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admissions criteria.202 The university’s obvious justification
will be that standardized tests and GPA are the best
predictors for academic success, although not the only useful
predictors.203 Rational basis review is generally easy to
satisfy, therefore it is unlikely that a constitutional
challenge to a university’s use of LSATs and GPA and
Also, the
admissions criteria would be successful.204
Supreme Court’s opinion in Grutter makes it clear that
university’s should be given deference to determine the
admissions criteria that best allow the university to meet its
institutional goals.205
A student seeking a declaratory judgment that a
public university’s race-conscious admissions program is
justified based on past discrimination will also face
difficulties. First, both the district courts in Grutter and
Gratz, the Sixth Circuit in Grutter, and the Supreme Court
in Gratz emphasized the reason for the race-conscious
admissions policy given at the time the policy was
adopted.206 Therefore, even if the minority plaintiff came
forward with an alternative factual background for the
adoption of the race-conscious admissions policy, it is
unclear whether a court would require the university to
publicly adopt a specific justification for the program.
202 See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2495 (2003) (citing Washington

v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42) (stating that a facially race neutral policy
with no discriminatory intent is subject to “rational basis” review); Robert
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112
YALE. L. J. 1943, n.65 (2003) (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303-304 (1964)(describing rational basis review); James E. Ryan,
The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation
Cases, 81 Nor. Car. L. rev. 1659, 1694 (2003) (stating that a policy which
is facially neutral, with no finding of discriminatory intent will be subject
to rational basis review, which is typically simple to satisfy).
203 See Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2332 (stating that Law School admissions officials
must consider LSAT scores as admissions criteria, because they are “important (if
imperfect) predictors of academic success in law school.”).
204 See supra note 197; see Kidder & Rosner, supra note 197, at 173 (2002) (stating
that an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the use of standardized tests is likely a
dead end, but describing a viable disparate impact challenge to the use of
standardized tests).
205 See Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2339 (stating that the Court’s holding is in keeping
with the Court’s deference to a university’s academic decisions).
206 See supra notes 158-163.
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Therefore, the minority plaintiff would likely need to seek a
declaratory judgment that the university should adopt a
more expansive race-conscious policy then the policy already
in place, in order to remedy the university’s past
discrimination. A model for this would be desegregation
cases in which state’s were required by court order or
administrative order to adopt affirmative measures to
desegregate a school system.
The advantage to minority students and public
interest organizations in abandoning intervention in favor of
becoming plaintiffs is that as plaintiffs there are expansive
rhetorical, narrative advantages.207 Despite the claim that
in public law litigation, intervention provides a method for
the protection of third party interests, the treatment by the
courts of the intervenors in the recent affirmative action
education cases demonstrates that may courts confronted
with public law litigation continue to treat the litigation as a
bi-polar enterprise. The court allows the plaintiff and
defendant the powerful narrative tool of shaping the
framework of the litigation, both in evidence and legal
arguments. By becoming plaintiffs in litigation in lawsuits
against university defendants, minority students would be
able to assume this narrative highground. The courts
making decisions in these cases would be forced to confront
and engage with the arguments put forth by minority
students. Even if ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation,
arguably the minority students and public interest groups
advocating further change in admissions programs would be
practically no worse off than they are today, in the sense
that although the university’s would still use LSAT and
GPA as predominant admissions criteria, race conscious
remedies would also remain in place.
Due to the obvious barriers to successful litigation
regarding admissions criteria, and the use of race-conscious
remedies to remedy past discrimination, other alternatives
should be explored by minority students seeking to gain
narrative highground. One method that has proven to be
successful for advocates interested in transforming
207 See Lawrence, supra note 107, at 946-47 (arguing that minorities serving as
plaintiffs in lawsuits against universities regarding admissions policies has strong
rhetorical value by giving voice to a different view of what constitutes equality and
justice); Kidder & Rosner, supra note 197, at 143 (suggesting a litigation strategy for
minority students to challenge the use of standardized testing).
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admissions policies is the use of legislative alternatives. In
Texas, after the Hopwood decision that ended the use of
traditional race-conscious admissions policies, minority
legislators developed an alternative admissions program
called the Texas Ten Percent Plan.208 The Texas Ten
Percent Plan allows for students graduating in the top ten
percent from a Texas high school would be automatically
admitted to any college or university in the state.209 The
minority legislators also succeeded in revolutionizing the
debate surrounding admissions criteria in general, by
shifting the focus of the admissions policy away from
standardized testing.210 Also, the adoption of the Texas Ten
Percent Plan allowed the legislature to examine the state’s
higher education system as a continuation of the state’s
efforts to create equal quality education at the elementary
and secondary school levels.211 These goals are similar to
208 See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, THE MINER'S CANARY 72 (2002)
(recalling the coalition of minority legislators and their purposes in
proposing the Texas Ten percent Plan); Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer,
Note, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 245, 252-60
(describing the legislative process of adopting the Texas Ten Percent
Plan). California and Florida also have percentage plans that use GPA,
instead of standardized test scores as the primary criteria for college
admissions. See generally William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from
Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African American, Latino, and Native
American Admissions: 1950-2000, 19 Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal 1,
29-30 (2003) (detailing the California and Florida percentage plans);
Douglass C. Lawrence, Note, Challenging Affirmative Action: Does
Diversity Justify Race-Conscious Admissions Programs?, 36 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. 83 (2002) (describing California and Florida percentage plans).
209 See William E. Forbath & Gerald Torres, Merit and Diversity after
Hopwood, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 185 (1999) (detailing criteria of Texas
Ten Percent Plan); Holley & Spencer, supra note 204, at 245 (describing
requirements of ten percent Plan).
210 See Holley & Spencer, supra note 204, at 260 (arguing that through the adoption
of the Texas Ten Percent Plan the Texas legislature sought to redefine “merit” as
separate from standardized test scores).
211 See Lawrence, supra note 104, at 969 (“By treating the top students at
each of the state's schools as "most qualified," the University takes
responsibility for existing discriminatory conditions in a state where most
schools are still racially segregated and unequally financed, training
future leaders from oppressed and under-served communities, and
challenging the state to make its separate and unequal schools equal.”);
Holley & Spencer, supra note 204, at 262 (stating that the Ten Percent
Plan places emphasis on equalizing the quality of secondary school
education because the state is further motivated by the need to prepare
students for higher education); but see Michelle Adams, Isn’t it Ironic:
The Central Paradox at the Heart of Percentage Plans, 62 Ohio St. L. J.
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the goals of the students and public interest groups that
have become intervenors in the recent affirmative action
education cases.
Furthermore, drafting and advocating legislation that
would advocate less reliance on standardized testing as an
admissions criteria, would serve as a direct narrative
contrast to opponents of race-conscious remedies who have
used ballot initiatives in California and Washington to end
the use of race conscious remedies in those states.212 Also,
legislative action specifically to acknowledge that the use
race-conscious policies in admissions is justified by the
state’s commitment to remedying past discrimination and
ending ongoing segregation in secondary and elementary
education echoes other recent movements by civil rights
organizations, such as the racial reconciliation and
reparations movement.

Conclusion
Through intervention, minority students and public
interest groups have sought to preserve race-conscious
admissions policies on their merits, but also to gain
recognition for their unique narrative.
The minority
students’
narrative
which
presents
race-conscious
admissions policies as a method of ending continuing racial
inequality and offsetting the negative impact of admissions
criteria such as the LSAT has remained at the margins in
higher education affirmative action litigation. In order for
this narrative to gain narrative force, minority students
must shift away from their procedural posture as
intervenors towards becoming plaintiffs in litigation or
proponents of legislation that revolutionizes higher
education admissions criteria.

1729 (2001) (asserting that percentage plans diversify higher education
through a continued reliance of segregated elementary and secondary
schools).
212 See generally Lawrence, supra note 104, at 952-56 (recounting the California
ballot initiative and organizing by minority students to repeal the anti-affirmative
action amendment).

